Weekly Digest 28.04.2026 – 04.05.2026

4th May 2026: The Ministry of Defence announced a ceasefire on May 8-9.

State media reported that, by the Ministry of Defence’s decision, Russian Federation forces would halt combat operations on 8 to 9 May in honour of Victory Day. The announcement was coupled with a warning of force if the celebrations were disrupted, making the ceasefire both a commemorative gesture and a coercive signal.

RIGRI’s comment: Victory Day is the most important state ritual in contemporary Russia’s civil holiday, rivalling only the New Year. Turning it into a formal ceasefire frame shows how the Kremlin uses the memory of 1945 to regulate present-day expectations of legitimacy and state power more than 80 years later.

30th April 2026: Russia marks its first Day of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples, and Putin says all peoples must feel the country is their common home.

At the “Znanie.Pervye” marathon in Moscow, Vladimir Putin met representatives of Russia’s small-numbered Indigenous peoples and discussed preserving their languages, cultures, crafts, traditions, and educational materials. He said Russia’s strength lies in its diversity and described the country as a “single family of peoples,” promising continued state support, including social guarantees, traditional livelihoods, and attention to Indigenous interests in Arctic, Siberian, and Far Eastern development projects. The meeting also marked the first official Day of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of Russia, established by presidential decree in 2025.

RIGRI’s comment:  It shows the Kremlin trying to expand the official civic-national narrative by recognising minority cultures, while still embedding that recognition within a centralised vision of unity and loyalty.

The articles present civic Russian identity as multiethnic yet unified: many peoples, languages, and traditions are framed as parts of one national home. This is part of a state narrative in which ethnic diversity is presented as Russian patriotism and as a source of Russia’s historical strength, continuity, and collective destiny. Cultural diversity is recognised only among those indigenous peoples who exhibit no political ambition or developed elites.

29th April 2026: Citizens consider Russia's multinationality to be its strength, Kiriyenko said

Sergei Kiriyenko, First Deputy Head of Russia’s Presidential Administration, said polling shows 94% of Russian citizens view the country’s multiethnic character of 194 nationalities and ethnic groups as a strength. He added that 84% of Russians feel positively about living near people of other nationalities, while only 12% say such proximity causes anxiety. Kiriyenko presented these figures at the “Znanie.Pervye” marathon as the highest such indicators in recent years.

RIGRI’s comment: This statement reflects constitutional language about the “multinational people of the Russian Federation” and official policy linking unity, civic identity, and cultural diversity. However, the statistics underlying it are dubious at best. Russian authorities are known to manipulate statistical data for ideological reasons. In this case, multinationalism remains a core propagandistic narrative, while the actual levels of everyday racism in Russian society remain unknown.

28th April 2026: “Method 3” is removed from major streaming platforms for “discrediting traditional values.”

The Method-3 series was removed from the online streaming services Kinopoisk and Ivi following a Roskomnadzor request based on a Ministry of Culture finding. Producer Vladimir Maslov said the platforms were not given clear explanations of which laws or “traditional values” the show allegedly violated, and argued that the series is an 18+ work of fiction rather than an attempt to glorify crime. Kinopoisk said the finding accused the series of containing material that discredits or promotes rejection of “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.” At the same time, Ivi confirmed the removal but declined further comment.

RIGRI’s comment:   The “traditional values” have moved from rhetorical doctrine to administrative enforcement. The state is defining what mass audiences are no longer allowed to watch. The criteria for censorship are not known; thus, any cultural product may be subject to prohibition without prior notice, resulting in substantial financial losses for producers. This measure will likely negatively affect the development and distribution of cultural products and undermine Russian soft power.

Weekly Digest 21.04.2026 – 27.04.2026

27th April 2026: Lenin Rooms and Sovintern: They're Trying to Bring the USSR Back to Moscow

The new socialist international forum “Sovintern” started in Moscow’s House of Unions, described as an international socialist network initiated by the Just Russia party and framed around the legacy of “Soviet civilisation.” Delegates from several countries attended, and the opening included a greeting letter from Vladimir Putin. At the same time, discussions covered socialism, AI, Donbas, “digital partisans,” anti-imperialism, and a “Third World War” framing. In addition, a proposal by Senator Ayrat Gibatdinov to revive Soviet-style “Lenin rooms” (ideological lounges used for political education) in schools and workplaces for patriotic education.

RIGRI’s comment: Soviet nostalgia repackaged as a nation-building: “Soviet civilisation,” Lenin rooms, socialism, anti-imperialism, and Donbas are presented as symbols through which patriotism and collective memory can be rebuilt. The more they repeat the Soviet talking points, the more it sounds similar to the current talk of a “civilisation-state”, with adjustments to the economy and religion.

23rd April 2026: Digital blackout is openly normalised.

At a government meeting, Putin said internet outages in large cities were tied to anti-terror and anti-drone operations, and that public safety would always take priority. He nonetheless instructed officials to ensure that essential services such as payments, Gosuslugi, and medical-booking platforms continue to function during restrictions. The same day, Russian-language reporting said the whitelist of sites accessible during mobile internet shutdowns was expanded to include Soloviev Live, GLONASS, Premier, Ruwiki, the Popular Front, Dobro.ru, and Znanie, while Reuters reported mounting criticism from businesses and ordinary users over the scale of disruptions.

RIGRI’s comment: This was a major governance signal: the state is no longer treating blackouts as exceptional but as a normal security instrument, while building a curated layer of “approved” connectivity underneath them. As a non-user, Putin likely views the internet restrictions as a means of suppressing growing public dissent.

23rd April 2026: Demography is reframed as a supportive, whole-of-society national mission.

At the conference “Demographic Breakthrough in Russia: Paths to Achievement,” organisers from the Presidential Administration, the Federation Council, and the Labour Ministry promoted a corporate demographic standard, family-oriented urban infrastructure, and new mechanisms of family support. Government media said new tax support for working parents with two or more children was among the headline themes. At the same event, Sergey Novikov said Russian society was tired of prohibition-based rhetoric and argued that policy should instead create an atmosphere of encouragement and support for larger families; Putin’s written greeting cast birth-rate support, large families, and child-rearing in multigenerational households as national priorities involving the state, business, NGOs, religious institutions, and media.

RIGRI’s comment:  The Kremlin is trying to preserve a family-values identity agenda while presenting it less as coercion and more as managed encouragement. Trying to refrain from financial assistance, they are now asking businesses to assist with demographic policies.

22nd April 2026: The State Council opens a new campaign to preserve and digitise Russia’s “cultural code.”

At an expanded meeting of the culture commission of the State Council, Alexei Dyumin said a later State Council session in the Year of Unity of the Peoples of Russia would focus on preserving historical and cultural heritage “in all its diversity.” He said Russia had more than 160,000 heritage monuments and archive shelves stretching over 8,500 kilometres, called for faster restoration of more than 1,000 sites by 2030, and promoted a single digital knowledge space based on digitised library, archive, and museum collections. He also explicitly linked historical memory to resistance against destructive ideological influence from “unfriendly” states.

RIGRI’s comment: Instead of genuine federalism and the recognition of the right to self-determination, officials of the Russian Federation promote a constructed image of multinational solidarity. The primary function of this unified, cultureless mass is political loyalty.

22nd April 2026: Putin named the FSB Academy after Felix Dzerzhinsky.

On 22 April 2026, Vladimir Putin restored the honorary name “F. E. Dzerzhinsky” to the FSB Academy, Russia’s main security service university, with the decree citing the academy staff’s merits and Dzerzhinsky’s contribution to state security. The academy had carried Dzerzhinsky’s name from 1962 to 1993, when it was the Higher School of the KGB of the USSR. Dzerzhinsky founded and led the Cheka, the Soviet security police associated with the Red Terror, making the renaming a highly symbolic revival of Soviet security-service heritage.

RIGRI’s comment: The state re-legitimising a Soviet security tradition as part of national memory, rather than treating the Soviet coercive apparatus as something to reject. In addition, since renaming is both a reward for the academy and remembrance of Dzerhinsky’s contribution to “state security”, it shows what the security services and Putin care about: loyalty, surveillance, coercive capacity, and protection of the state by any means necessary. A clear indication of what being conservative means for Russia, and what the historical roots of the Russian Federation really are.

Weekly Digest 14.04.2026 – 20.04.2026

20th April 2026: An official from the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation linked the government's decisions with genuine concern for citizens' interests.

Alexander Kharichev, a senior Kremlin official responsible for monitoring and analysing social processes, argues that public trust in the state is the core bond holding Russia together and that this trust rests on four things: honesty, tangible results, genuine concern for citizen interests, and less distance between the authorities and society. He presents Russia as facing not only demographic, technological, and social pressures, but also a “hybrid war” of military, economic, and informational pressure aimed at weakening unity, rewriting the past, and undermining trust in the state. He also describes Russian identity as layered: ethnic identity as on at the base, an all-Russian civic identity above it, with a civilizational-value identity tied to traditional values and a shared national code at the top.

RIGRI’s comment: Kharichev is the chief architect behind the current attempt to create an ideology for the Russian Federation. He is trying to define national identity as both multiethnic and politically unified: people belonging to different ethnic groups and religions, but expected to share a common civic (Rossiyane/Russovians) loyalty to the Russian state and a common set of traditional values.

19th April 2026: First nationwide observance of the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Genocide of the Soviet People.

Media and official structures of the Russian Federation marked 19 April 2026 as the first countrywide observance of the new memorial date dedicated to victims of the genocide of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War. Reporting that day highlighted exhibitions including “No Statute of Limitations,” archival work, and the declassification of historical case materials by the security services, while diplomatic and parliamentary voices linked the date to contemporary battles over historical interpretation.

RIGRI’s comment: ‘Soviet people’ have been reborn as a political concept, even without the Soviet Union. Now it is part of an official Russian civic identity, rooted in collective victimhood from external forces, wartime sacrifice, and moral confrontation. Now it becomes a durable instrument for schools, museums, archives, regional authorities, and diplomats.

19th April 2026: A memorial to victims of political repression has been dismantled in Tomsk. First time this has happened to a memorial complex.

In Tomsk, workers fenced off the Memorial Square for Victims of Political Repression, removed the “Stone of Sorrow” and other ethnic memorial stones, and effectively began dismantling the broader commemorative site. Officials said the removal was a temporary safety measure because of a possible garage collapse and slope instability, and that the memorial objects were put into storage, but eyewitnesses, activists, and local critics said that explanation was unconvincing, pointed to police restrictions on access and photography, and stressed that the site stands by the former NKVD prison and dates back to 1992. This demolition is a part of a wider shift in official memory politics in 2026: the Supreme Court had just banned the international Memorial movement as “extremist,” politicians were attacking similar monuments, and the state was simultaneously elevating a new official remembrance narrative around the “genocide of the Soviet people.”

RIGRI’s comment: On the same day as commemoration of the ‘genocide of the soviet people’. Cannot be clearer than that. The only memory the state wants is the memory of others killing civilians, not the state itself. Garage story shows they continue to bother with pretences, but just barely. Just as the new memory is introduced, a contradicting past, where suffering was imposed by an internal actor, is being removed by the state.

16th April 2026: The Prosecutor General's Office has determined that the Katyn massacre was carried out by the NKVD. An exhibition featuring historical falsifications is now open at the execution site.

A new exhibition at Katyn by the Russian Military Historical Society revives the old Soviet falsehood that the 1940 massacre of Polish prisoners was carried out by the Germans, even though Soviet authorities admitted in 1990 that the NKVD was responsible. The claim contradicts both late Soviet and current official records, citing the 1990 TASS statement, a 2005 letter from the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, and a 2010 State Duma declaration acknowledging that the killings were carried out by the NKVD on Stalin’s orders. The new exhibition is a politically motivated distortion of established historical facts at the very site of the massacre.

RIGRI’s comment: Few have noted the fact that the stand is having an open contradiction with the official version that Putin accepted. Was that historical inaccuracy there because of revisionists within the historical society and slipped through, or is it a complete reversal of Soviet denialism, and was it an order from the leadership?

16th April 2026: "Now they decide everything." The Russian Internet has a new curator: the FSB agency responsible for Navalny's poisoning.

Russia’s recent crackdown on the internet messengers, tougher anti-VPN measures, and the broader campaign against foreign platforms are being driven by the FSB’s Second Service, a political-security unit better known for targeting opposition figures than for telecom regulation. This marks a major institutional shift: control of the RuNet (Russian Internet) has moved away from more technical FSB structures and toward a branch associated with “defending the constitutional order,” ideological policing, and the persecution of dissidents, with Alexei Sedov’s team allegedly gaining broad authority after a 2025 meeting with Putin. This harder line has deepened tensions between security officials and civilian technocrats, while provoking public backlash, rising VPN demand, and concern inside the Kremlin over the political costs of internet restrictions.

RIGRI’s comment: The state is redefining the RuNet less as a technical or economic space and more as an ideological one. Sovereignty is enforced by treating foreign platforms and uncensored communication as threats to the nation. It signals a further shift from technocratic management of compliance to security-service rule. Control over the internet has been handed over entirely to the security services, which is criticised by civilians and government officials alike.

15th April 2026: Economic contraction acknowledged at the Kremlin, and growth proposals demanded

At an economic meeting in Moscow, Vladimir Putin said Russian GDP had fallen by 1.8% in January–February 2026 and noted that manufacturing, industrial output overall, and construction were in negative territory. He instructed the cabinet to prepare concrete proposals to restore growth, while Russian reporting emphasised that calendar and weather factors were part of the explanation but not the whole story. External reporting at the same time noted that the IMF had just raised its 2026 growth forecast for Russia to 1.1%, chiefly because higher oil prices were cushioning the slowdown.

RIGRI’s comment: When the president openly acknowledges contraction and demands fixes, it signals that the slowdown is serious. However, Putin is not willing to adjust his policies or strategy, meaning the economic situation is not critical yet.

Weekly Digest 07.04.2026 – 13.04.2026

11th April 2026: References to “Memorial” have been removed from the Yeltsin Centre’s exhibition.

Two plaques mentioning “Memorial” (a human rights group focused on the study of Soviet repressions) were removed from the Yeltsin Centre museum exhibition after Russian authorities said the organisation can no longer be referenced without special labelling. The Yeltsin Centre said it is discussing the issue with lawyers and expects changes to the exhibition, although it has not yet decided what those changes will be. It is connected to the recent decision by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to declare the so-called “International Public Movement Memorial” extremist and ban its activities, despite “Memorial” saying no such formally named organisation exists.

RIGRI’s comment:The Russian Federation's memorial policy denies any crimes of the Soviet state, as Putin considers the modern Russian Federation the successor and legal heir to the USSR. Therefore, the prohibition and exclusion of “Memorial” from public life were inevitable. In the future, the persecution of activists and historians involved in research on the crimes of the Soviet state appears more likely than ever.

11th April 2026: Space-sector meeting plus Cosmonautics Day messages emphasise security, development, and prestige.

In the run-up to Cosmonautics Day, the President held a working meeting with Roscosmos leadership, with coverage highlighting performance indicators and plans (including satellite constellation and launch infrastructure topics). The head of Roscosmos, Dmitry Bakanov, reported (in coverage) on the size of the orbital constellation and discussed operational and security aspects, including claims about attempted drone attacks on a space facility. On 12 April, Cosmonautics Day messaging linked space capability to “economy, security and sovereignty,” and a greeting was issued to participants of a gala event connected to the holiday. In parallel, greetings framed space culture as a civic resource (e.g., a message to a space-themed film festival in Kaluga).

RIGRI’s comment:Space achievements remain among the most enduring pillars of national pride in the Russian Federation, although they are largely inherited from the Soviet Union in the absence of current successes in this area. Yuri Gagarin anchors continuity between Soviet-era prestige and present-day sovereignty claims, being capable of launching space rockets. The linkage of space capability to security and quality of life legitimises large-scale public investment and strategic-industrial mobilisation for the military.

11th April 2026: The Cinema Fund has revealed a list of 17 spiritual and moral values ​​for films receiving non-repayable state support.

The Cinema Fund of the Russian Federation has published a questionnaire for films seeking non-repayable state support, requiring them to be evaluated against 17 “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,” including life, dignity, human rights and freedoms, patriotism, family, mercy, justice, historical memory, unity of the peoples of Russia, and collectivism. Applicants must explain how their project reflects those values and its social significance. Expert readers will score each value from 0 to 10, after which the highest-rated films will move on to the Expert Council and then to funding decisions coordinated with the Culture Ministry. The subsidy rules explicitly require such films to support Russia’s war against Ukraine.

RIGRI’s comment:The Russian political regime seeks to formalise the presence of so-called “traditional values” in the media space. However, compliance with these values is evaluated by designated “experts,” whose qualifications and independence are highly questionable. This process reinforces government censorship not only along political lines but also in terms of a narrowly defined cultural framework subject to arbitrary interpretation.

10th April 2026: The Ministry of Justice has added Stanford University to the list of undesirable institutions in the Russian Federation.

Russia’s Justice Ministry added Stanford University to the list of “undesirable” organisations on April 10, 2026, following an earlier Prosecutor General’s decision, which included the Russian American Science Association. People who have already graduated from Stanford do not face punishment merely for holding a Stanford diploma, but those who continue studying, participating in grants, exchanges, internships, or related programs after April 10, 2026, could face administrative or even criminal liability.

RIGRI’s comment:The continuous effort by the Russian Federation to ban foreign universities as agents of foreign influence undermines science within the country itself. Modern science is globalised and unthinkable outside an international perspective. While Russian authorities believe they are counteracting foreign influence, they in fact hinder scientific progress and simultaneously encourage academics and intellectuals to go abroad to avoid persecution.

10th April 2026: High-level meeting sets national AI deployment goals and prioritises domestic “sovereign” AI models.

Coverage of the AI meeting reported instructions to develop a national plan for AI implementation with regional participation and a target that AI technologies should be used across major sectors by 2030. A second, repeated theme in reporting was the insistence that fundamental AI models should be domestic and “maximally sovereign”, linking technological independence to defence and national security.

RIGRI’s comment:The “sovereign AI” framing turns technological policy into an identity claim: the Russian Federation is presented as a civilisation-state that must control strategic knowledge systems rather than import them. This signals the continued fusion of economic modernisation with the security state, in which AI serves as both productivity infrastructure and a defence substrate. It remains unclear whether foreign influences are permitted for catch-up or whether it must be fully sovereign, like the North Korean internet. VPN blockages have made it clear that talk of sovereignty now tends to dominate over economic performance.

Weekly Digest 31.03.2026 – 06.04.2026

6th April 2026: Ex-governor of the Kursk region sentenced to 14 years in prison in the case of bribery during the construction of fortifications.

A court sentenced former Kursk region governor Alexey Smirnov to 14 years in prison for taking large bribes, fined him 400 million Rubles, barred him from holding public office for 10 years, and ordered the confiscation of 20.9 million Rubles. Smirnov admitted guilt and struck a deal with investigators, while prosecutors said he and another official took nearly 13 million Rubles for protection in school-repair contracts and about 8 million more from a regional deputy whose company-built border fortifications with Ukraine. Investigators linked the fortification case to up to 1 billion Rubles in embezzlement, and Smirnov testified that former governor Roman Starovoit (who was found dead in July 2025) had suggested collecting percentages from contractors.

RIGRI’s comment: It is quite a contrast with Tsalikov’s case. Harsher punishment despite cooperation sends a message that background does matter in the Russian Federation, as if it were a neo-feudal system.

4th April 2026: Kasperskaya apologised to Roskomnadzor for linking the failure of banks with the blocking of VPN

Natalya Kasperskaya (co-founder of Kaspersky Lab) apologised to Roskomnadzor after previously linking a mass outage at Russian banks and the Faster Payments System to efforts to block VPNs. After speaking with Roskomnadzor’s leadership, she said the disruption was apparently not caused by the regulator and may instead have stemmed from a problem at Sberbank, whose infrastructure is closely connected to other banks. Previously, she had warned that blocking VPNs could disrupt critical online services because VPN protocols overlap with infrastructure used by banks, while the outage itself affected major banking apps.

RIGRI’s comment: A boomerang effect of apologies is a way to confirm an association of Roskomnadzor with the recent Internet outages. Alternatively, if we are to believe the argument of all banks sharing one infrastructure, then the entire financial system in the Russian Federation is completely under state control, with no independent banks. In any case, apologies to Roskomnadzor are a new development, usually expected from Kadyrov’s critics.

3rd April 3026: The premiere of the spy detective series "Centuria" about the work of special services took place in Moscow.

A premiere for the spy detective series Centuria was held at Moscow’s Khudozhestvenny cinema on April 3, 2026, with the project based on “real stories” from Russian state security practice involving alleged Ukrainian nationalist underground groups and foreign agent networks. The plot follows a Russian intelligence officer working undercover in Mariupol to identify the handler of a CIA-linked network allegedly preparing a terrorist attack in Russia. The piece also presents the series as a warning to parents and young people about “cognitive warfare” and teenage recruitment that turns them into “biodrones”.

RIGRI’s comment: Centuria is a Ukrainian patriotic youth organization, which makes it a perfect scapegoat for Russian propaganda, which seeks to construct a false image of “Nazis” around any issue connected to Ukrainian patriotism and nation-building. By presenting itself as a warning, the series highlights what the state perceives as a threat: the combination of nationalism and covert activities by foreign powers.

3rd April 2026: The Russian Orthodox Church confirmed that it has received two icons from the Tretyakov Gallery for 49 years of use.

The Russian Orthodox Church said the Tretyakov Gallery has transferred the Vladimir and Don Mother of God/Eleusa (Virgin Mary) icons to church institutions for free use for 49 years, with both icons to be placed in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour from April 4. According to the report, the Don icon will later move to the Donskoy Monastery after restoration work there is completed, while the Vladimir icon had previously been kept in the St. Nicholas Church-Museum in Tolmachi. Both icons remain part of Russia’s state museum collection under the Tretyakov Gallery, whose specialists will retain access for inspections, noting that the gallery similarly transferred Andrei Rublev’s “Trinity” to the Church for 49 years in 2023.

RIGRI’s comment: Despite the notion that the Russian Orthodox Church is slowly reclaiming the artefacts, this action is a reminder from the state that is in charge. A lease instead of a full transfer reminds the church who is still in charge without the need for an open repression. The transfer will likely lead to the deterioration of the icons, which will gradually degrade outside museum conditions. This approach prioritizes religious use over the preservation of historical artistic masterpieces.

2nd April 2026: Medvedev called for countering the creation of ethnic enclaves in the Russian Federation

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, called preventing the formation of ethnic enclaves by migrants in Russia an urgent issue that deserves close attention. He argued that when foreign nationals live in compact clusters in separate areas, this can hinder their adaptation and weaken compliance with Russian laws and “law-abiding behaviour.” He also spoke of a planned package of legislative measures to speed up decisions on declaring certain foreign nationals’ stay undesirable, including immediate deportation if a migrant is found to have a dangerous disease.

RIGRI’s comment: When high-ranking officials publicly admit demographic issues, the situation has shifted significantly from the previous status quo. Had Medvedev not been a part of the same government behind the immigration, a legal reform would have been expected. Instead, it is presumably a statement that will allow others to pretend that the Russian Federation is tackling migration. Simultaneously, the government of the Russian Federation is likely to prefer assimilating foreigners rather than allowing unrestricted multiculturalism.

Weekly Digest 24.03.2026 – 30.03.2026

27th March 2026: The Ministry of Justice demanded that Memorial be recognised as an extremist organisation.

The Justice Ministry of the Russian Federation has asked the Supreme Court to declare the “International Public Movement Memorial” an extremist organisation. The case is scheduled to be heard behind closed doors at 11:00 on 9 April, and no further details have been published in the docket. In late 2021, Russia’s Supreme Court and Moscow City Court ordered the liquidation of International Memorial and the Memorial Human Rights Centre over alleged violations of the “foreign agents” law. Afterwards, Memorial’s work continued through a new Human Rights Defence Centre and social media.

RIGRI’s comment: ‘Memorial’ was the main organisation responsible for uncovering repressions during the Soviet period, helping the church to discover numerous martyrs. Constant closing of it sends a clear signal that the official state view on the Soviet past sees no repression and does not allow it to be challenged.

27th March 2026: Security Council meeting on relations with the EU: strategic framing and identity boundary-making

The Security Council of the Russian Federation held an operational meeting chaired by the president, with the agenda publicly framed around the “European track.” Reporting describes the president hearing a briefing by Sergey Lavrov and emphasising that Russia had not refused the development/restoration of relations with Europe, while attributing the deterioration of relations to Western actors. The meeting thus served as an official venue for reiterating the state’s explanatory narrative about the Russia–Europe rupture and the terms under which “restoration” might be imagined.

RIGRI’s comment:  The council meeting is presented as a discussion of relations between two distinct civilisational blocks instead of just diplomacy. It is a gradual progress in establishing a narrative of the Russian Federation as a distinct civilisation in a multipolar world, one part of the ideology in making.

26th March 2026: During the Culture Council meeting, Putin ordered the introduction of quotas on the distribution of foreign films in the Russian Federation.

Vladimir Putin ordered officials to introduce quotas for foreign films in Russia as quickly as possible, saying at a meeting of the Council for Culture that Russia should more tightly regulate imported cinema, as France and China do. Putin argued that the issue is both ideological and financial: he criticised Russia for allowing what he called “stupid” and “unnecessary” material through while failing to support domestic producers. The discussion was closely tied to Nikita Mikhalkov’s lobbying on behalf of Russian cinema, noting that he had previously proposed a 5 million Ruble fee for foreign films and again raised the question of quotas at this meeting. Another idea supported by the president at a meeting of the Culture Council is to use artistic works without the consent of their heirs, if they refuse permission. Putin stated that a law should be passed that would permit the use of works without the consent of copyright holders who are not the authors and who set patently impossible conditions.

RIGRI’s comment:

The quota push makes culture a matter of state-managed identity since foreign cinema is explicitly framed as an ideological issue. With most domestically sponsored films making a loss last year, harsher control is required to spread official values. It also serves as a reminder of how Putin is not an Internet user, since these quotas only affect cinemas that already see a decline in attendance.

25th March 2026: Duma adopts a federal law reforming oversight of local self-government

The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation reported that the Duma adopted a federal law introducing a risk-oriented approach for oversight/control activities regarding local self-government bodies and municipal officials, signalling tighter and more standardised supervisory architecture for municipalities. The legislative track is reflected in the Duma’s legislative system dossier for the relevant bill, which documents its progression on the parliamentary calendar.

RIGRI’s comment: Local self-government is a core arena where civic identity and the felt legitimacy of the state are produced. A more centralised, risk-based oversight model reframes citizenship from local participatory self-rule toward compliance and service delivery within a unified state system, as part of an envisioned ideology.

24th March 2026: Duma expands ban on probation periods for women with small children

‍The Duma adopted amendments to the Labour Code expanding protections for women with young children by prohibiting employers from imposing a probationary period for women whose children are under three years old, extending a pre-existing protection that applied to mothers of children under 18 months. The bill dossier in the Duma system identifies the initiative (by number) and formalises it as a legislative act moving through the federal lawmaking pipeline.

RIGRI’s comment: An interesting way to tackle the demographic issue alongside the economic one. However, protecting a new mother’s work position does not guarantee a rise in fertility or an increase in economic productivity. Studies suggest that increasing the maternity capital payments for the second and third child remains the only proven way to increase fertility. Sadly for the leadership of the Russian Federation, it requires additional finances that wouldn’t be spent on advancing international and other domestic interests.