Why neo-feudalism makes the most sense to describe modern Russia

Addressing the policies starts with identifying the issue, with the Russian policy being no exception. Without a clear understanding, initial sanctions have prevented most of the domestic capital drain from Russia. Kremlin did not have to initiate all unpopular financial measures to stabilise the economy. The next step is assessing the socio-political situation, which identifies the power structure and what can be done to weaken it. The Kremlin presents itself as a democratic regime where Putin manifests people’s desires. Despite this statement, contemporary Russia is neither free nor democratic, and the discussion arises on the specifics of the most accurate term. ‘Sovereign democracy’ can only describe the previous power structure before Putin became an immovable figure. This article will argue that neo-feudalism best describes contemporary Russia, especially given Putin’s statist view towards post-feudal ideas of Nationalism, separating it from neo-reaction. 

‘Sovereign democracy’: a term for the past 

Contemporary Russia cannot be described as a ‘sovereign democracy’ since that term involves a semblance of democratic rule and not personal rule as a president. Outlined in the 2000s by Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov, ‘sovereign democracy’ was set to ensure that the Russian government could remain the sole authority, within and outside, economic and political. In practice, it was a process of power consolidation to ensure there could be no challenge to power, be it from the remains of Soviet bureaucracy, oligarchy, ‘extremists’ (non-official opposition), and foreign influence. At that period, there still was a facade of democracy in the form of the United Russia as a party of power, which remains the largest political party in parliament. Now Surkov is out of power and can only repeat after the Kremlin, further proving that his work was done to make Putin sovereign.

With sovereignty built up to the point that Russia can continue operations across the globe and not be discouraged by the economic prospects of sanctions, the executive power in the form of the president is setting policies directly. There is no more need for such pretensions. Now, Putin can act under Articles 80 and 10 of the Russian constitution. Article 10 states that all branches of power are independent/sovereign, being able to make decisions without any intervention, including the public one. Article 80 calls the president a ‘guarantor’ of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, designating him as the one true sovereign who is truly in charge. Considering that those articles have always been present and were not subject to the 2020 amendments, the path to autocracy was established from the very beginning, with Yeltsin being too sick to utilise the power given to him properly. 

Neo-feudal structure of power in Russia

Currently, the centre of power in Russia is in the executive branch. With the president being the chief figure, three other groups possess autonomy and the capacity to act as groups to apply direct force. Without the unity of these groups, the president cannot be ousted, and there can be no palace coup. The first group is the security forces/’siloviki,’ a former dominant organisation until Putin began to restructure the power structure and made himself irreplaceable. The second group is the military, which had its budget raised, boosting it against historical supervision by the security forces. The third group is the National Guard, whose main goal is to protect the existing order, being the president’s praetorian army. What makes Russia’s power structure closer to neo-feudal than neo-reactionary is the maintenance of regional elites who can ignore federal agencies as long as they keep pledging loyalty to the president, as best demonstrated by the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov.

Previously, Private Military Companies (PMCs) also functioned as a fifth power group and were not accountable to federal authorities because they could relocate without losing force capabilities. Prigozhin’s uprising demonstrated why such independence was too dangerous, further reinforcing the neo-feudal mindset of immobility and stable power bases. What truly matters to these groups' survival is loyalty to the president. Once the loyalty to the president is secured and publicly shown, these groups are allowed to bypass many rules that others must follow. As another contributor noted in the opinion section, Russia experiences extreme economic inequality. Moreover, the relatively wealthier non-Russian populations have greater financial resources, providing them with a vested interest in maintaining the current status quo.

Putin’s feudal perception of nationalism: anyone who serves him is Russian

The perception of Putin as a nationalist exists for one reason: the suppression of people who disagree or people who will always see Putin in such a way. Given Putin’s speeches, his view of nations and peoples is closer to the feudal ideas of the population. The only thing that matters to him is that the people within Russia serve him. Those people can be of different religions or ethnicities; they do not have to share the values that modern nations possess. When Putin said, ‘unlike other nations, old or rapidly ageing, we are still on the rise—we are a fairly young nation. We have an infinite genetic code. It is based on a mixing of bloods, to put it simply and plainly,’ he was invoking Gumilev’s Eurasianism. Gumilev’s idea of ‘passionarity’ covers the rise and fall of civilisation, which absorbs numerous nationalities throughout its history. That idea is reflected in Russia’s Constitution, beginning with the multinational people as the foundation of modern Russia. Russian ethnic nationalism is too rigid for such a concept.

With such inflexibility, Putin must look for additional nations. Luckily for him, globalisation simplifies immigration, no longer requiring conquest across Eurasia. Whereas people who are known to be nationalists see immigration as a threat to the preservation of existing groups. For Putin, it is a solution and a necessary step in reforging ethnicities into a brand-new, civilisation-wide nation that knows only service to Russia, and Putin as its leader. Putin, in his own words, wants to create a multiethnic and multireligious (not secular)  Rossiyski/Rusovian nation, made up of all ethnicities and cultures of Russia. He believes that due to ethnic Russians not having any preference by the state is the foundation that made other cultures and ethnicities willing to accept the rule by Russia. For Putin, the process of creating a new nation lies in centuries of mixed marriages, which cements interethnic and interfaith unity. Putin cites the Alexander the Great process, which historically did not end with a stable empire, so why he uses that example is a mystery for many. 

Even the ultranationalist Imperial Russian nationalists are confused. A multiethnic project was previously attempted with the Soviet nation, yet distinct identities still emerged. In mixed marriages, the two nationalities did not merge into one, but one tended to dominate the relationship. The case of Ukraine showed first- and second-generation migrants embracing and fighting to preserve Ukrainian identity. If Putin does not understand this, he must have a feudal view of people that excludes nationalism. When he called himself a nationalist, he meant being Russia's greatest patriot.

Throughout his presidential terms, the use of nationalist rhetoric remained uncertain and susceptible to change. With nationalist groups suppressed, exiled, or kowtowed, Putin can claim to co-opt Russian nationalism. However, it is only a superficial mask of nationalism, similar to what Stalin used to rally the Russian population during WW2 or to raise a toast for Russians. Stalin’s mask was removed the moment a challenge known as the Leningrad Affair. Bolstered by Stalin’s speeches, some Communist Party members sought to establish a separate Russian Communist Republic capital, much like other Soviet republics. The response was a purge and executions of key figures behind the idea, demonstrating that direct control was maintained through presiding nationalism, leaving Russia without an independent centre of power until Perestroika and Yeltsin established a new centre of power, taking it from the Communist Party. 

Putin’s feudal foreign policy: the case of Ukraine

Seeing Putin through a feudal prism can explain the abandonment of Ukrainian elites, save for one, and how actions against that one made war inevitable for Putin. As the Euromaidan was approaching its end, a deal was signed between Yanukovych and opposition leaders. Observed by foreign ministers, the deal called for new elections and a constitutional reform in exchange for the end of protests. However, civil society and protesters who were the key part of the Euromaidan have rejected that agreement, seeing no justice for the protesters killed. Following the escape of Yanukovych, Putin saw that he could not rely on Ukrainian elites to keep up future deals due to their lack of control over the population, and gave an endorsement for the Crimea operation the next day. Since then, Viktor Medvedchuk has been the sole Ukrainian representative whom Putin trusted. The reason behind this is that Medvedchuk is a relative a godfather of one of Putin’s daughters. 

Over the next 7 years, Putin had complete trust in Medvedchuk and built up a new pro-Russian party, with other Ukrainian politicians having to pass through him, a major change from the prior decade. Ultimately, Putin’s decision to initiate a full-scale invasion of Ukraine can be traced to Medvedchuk. It was Medvedchuk’s surveys that showed 46% of Putin’s support in Ukraine, making Putin believe that the invasion would be swift. And the house arrest of Medvedchuk in May 2021 removed the only person whom Putin trusted for soft power. Putin saw invasion as the only option left. And the moment Putin could get Medvedchuk through a prisoner exchange, swapping him for 10 other prisoners. That theory explains the timing of the invasion and the initial plans, published in a quickly deleted article, how the first plans suggested the fate of Belarus or Tajikistan, members of the Eurasian Economic Union. What Putin cares about is the control the elites provide and personal connection, with nationalism not being a part of his key decision-making process.

How will feudalism end

Modern Russia is best understood as a neo-feudal state, where systemic inequality and centralised executive control are combined with personal loyalty to the president that precedes the law. Nationalism is notably absent from Putin’s genuine worldview. Although he occasionally co-opts nationalist rhetoric, he neither understands nor embraces nationalism in the modern sense. Instead, he suppresses nationalist groups precisely because they represent a collective identity and a potential power centre beyond his authority. Neo-feudalism not only explains contemporary Russia; it also foreshadows its eventual transformation. Just as feudal societies worldwide were replaced by states based on the idea of the nation, Russian civil society, emerging out of nationalistic desire to improve the lives of Russians, will be the foundation of the future Russia.