Russia for Russians: Myth and Reality

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

1.1 The Thesis on the Priority of Russian Interests in State Organization during Different Historical Periods

2. From the 16th Century until the End of the 19th Century
2.1 The Falsity of the Thesis for this Period
2.2 Refutation of the Thesis
2.3 Peasant Revolts
2.4 The Decembrist Uprising
2.5 The Disproportionate Representation of Russians in State Institutions
2.6 The Great Reforms of Alexander II

3. From the End of the 19th Century to the Beginning of the 20th Century
3.1 Arguments of the Thesis’s Apologists
3.2 Refutation of the Arguments
3.3 “Russia for Russians and in a Russian Way”
3.4 The Policy of “Russification”
3.5 Revision of the Zemstvo Reform
3.6 Party Pluralism
3.7 Criticism of Government Arbitrariness from the Right

4. From 1917 to 1991
4.1 The Absurdity of the Thesis as Applied to the USSR
4.2 Russian Victims of Bolshevik Totalitarianism

5. From 1991 to the Present

5.1 “What is good for the Russian person is also in Russia’s national interest…”?
5.2 Putin’s “Proper Nationalism” and the Denial of the Rights and Interests of Russians
5.3 The Suppression of Russian Interests by the Current Political Regime
5.4 The Absence of Political Subjectivity
5.5 Repressions Against Russian Nationalists
5.6 Socio-Economic Disproportionality in the Russian Federation
5.7 Russian Demographic Catastrophe
5.8 The Phenomenon of Russian Emigration
5.9 “Substitute Immigration” and “Islamization”
5.10 Russian Resistance

6.  Conclusion
6.1 Research Findings
6.2 Three Options for Russians
6.3 The Russian Federation and Premodern
6.4 What Should Russians Do?

7.Bibliography

A number of authors—from a broad array of voices, including international academic experts on Russia, the originators of the term “imperial nationalism” and political commentators, to sincere apologists of the idea of the uniqueness of “Russian civilization” and the in-house propagandists of the current regime in the Russian Federation—frequently assert that, at various points in history from the 15th century to the present day, there have existed forms of statehood based on the idea of the priority of the organic interests of the Russian nation. Apologists for this thesis construct diverse argument systems which supposedly confirm their assertion. They draw upon the works of certain past historians (for example, Vasily Klyuchevsky’s reflections on the construction by Grand Prince Ivan III of a prototype of a “people’s Russian state” as a “striving for political unity on a popular basis”), interpretations of Emperor Alexander III’s “russification” policy, quotations from Stalin’s speeches and toasts, public statements by representatives of the executive power of the Russian Federation, … and even song lyrics by modern pop performers. Often, the aforementioned thesis is used either as propaganda for supporting the existing political regime—allegedly consistently representing the interests of Russian people—or for the purpose of creating a false impression of an a priori consent on the part of the Russian population to all social, economic, and political processes occurring in the Russian Federation. An unbiased and measured analysis of both this thesis and the factual circumstances of the historical and current state of the organic interests of the Russian population in the RF forces any independent researcher to reach completely opposite conclusions.

From the 15th Century until the Second Half of the 19th Century.

It is well known that the very concepts of “nation” and “nationalism” emerged in modern times and developed during the 19th century (in France of the 18th century, nationalism arose as a political movement aimed at establishing the priority of the nation’s interests over those of an absolute monarch, immediately becoming the antithesis of royalism). Moreover, it is an indisputable historical fact that the state structure in the form of samoderzhavie—as a variety of absolute monarchy—existed in the Grand Duchy of Moscow (beginning with Grand Prince Ivan III), the Russian Tsardom, and the Russian Empire (until the Manifesto of October 17, 1905). And, of course, the above-mentioned authors—while speaking of the “idea of creating a common fatherland for all Russian people” and a “sense of national unity”—doctorinely avoid the disgraceful truth of serfdom (the de facto slavery and slave trading) endured by the Russian people up to 1861, which primarily afflicted the Russian peasantry of the central regions (according to the census of 1857–1859, the share of serfs, for example, in the Smolensk and Tula provinces, was 69%). In this context, it does not seem necessary to seriously analyze the theses concerning the “organic unification of the sovereign with the people” and the “people’s state” during the 15th–19th centuries.

Nevertheless, it is important to note several historical events and circumstances that clearly demonstrate, on the one hand, the suppressed state of Russian interests (across various strata of society—from serfs to the nobility) in the state during this period, and on the other hand, the evident determination of the Russian population to fight the state for the establishment of the priority of their national interests by any available means (including armed rebellion).

Firstly, from the 16th through the 19th centuries, the number of general and peasant revolts (including several prolonged “peasant wars”) numbered in the hundreds and thousands. Except for rare cases where the uprisings were provoked by specific local crises such as food shortages or epidemics (for example, salt and plague riots), or were caused by regional, national, or occupational factors (for instance, the Muscovite “Streltsy” uprisings, the Bashkir uprising, and the Kizh uprising), most revolts were anti-government in nature. The uprisings of the Russian population spanned vast territories of the state and were based on an explicit political platform, usually characterized by demands for the abolition of serfdom and profound state reform (often without touching the institution of autocracy itself). According to researchers, between 1796 and 1860 there were 2,954 peasant uprisings and disturbances, of which 474 occurred between 1855 and 1860.

Secondly, there is the Decembrist uprising on December 14, 1825. This event was the culmination of the Russian anti-government movement during the late 1810s–early 1820s among members of the Russian aristocracy and nobility (many of whom were officers of the Guard). Ideologically, the uprising was aimed at the complete abolition of serfdom and the destruction of absolutism (with the views of the insurgents regarding the future state structure ranging from constitutional monarchy to a republic).

Thirdly, there was the disproportionately low representation of Russians in the state institutions of the Russian Empire during various historical periods (for example, at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries). In a 1913 work titled Russia and Europe, Professor Tomasz Masaryk presents striking statistics showing the dominant percentage of Germans in various state bodies at the end of Emperor Alexander II’s reign—from 27% in the Ministry of Internal Affairs to 62% in the Post and Telegraph. At that time, there were 1.3 million Germans in Russia, constituting only 1.1% of the entire population. It is not surprising that in this situation General Alexey Ermolov’s answer to the emperor’s question regarding what reward he would like to receive was: “Your Majesty, make me a German.”

Fourthly, even the most important of Alexander II’s “Great Reforms” of 1861 and 1864—namely, the abolition of serfdom and the Zemstvo Reform—only underscored the unfavourable position of the Russian population compared to other national groups within the Russian Empire. On March 5, 1861, the Supreme Manifesto on the Abolition of Serfdom was published. By that time, in the Baltic governorates of the Russian Empire—Estland, Courland, and Livonia—serfdom had been abolished almost 50 years earlier. In several provinces and regions with non-Russian populations, serfdom practically did not exist at all (for example, in Poland, Finland, the Semipalatinsk region, the region of the Siberian Kyrgyz, and the Derbent and Erivan governorates). Under the Zemstvo Reform, for the first time since the 16th century, elective non-estate institutions of local self-government for the Russian population (provincial and district zemstvos) were created to handle local economic issues, tax collection, education, medical services, and more. However, this turned out to be a mere experiment with limited practical impact (zemstvos were introduced in only 34 of over 80 provinces), and many of the achievements were curtailed during the counter-reforms of Emperor Alexander III. At the same time, the scale of Alexander II’s reforms in the Grand Duchy of Finland was incomparably greater for the Finnish population. In 1860, a separate Finnish currency—the mark—was introduced. In 1863, a Finnish parliament (the Diet) convened. In 1865, the Finnish mark ceased to be “pegged” to the Ruble, and the Finnish bank was reformed and placed under the control of the Finnish zemstvo administration. In 1869, the Diet Decree (in effect, the Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland) was issued.

From the End of the 19th Century until the Second Decade of the 20th Century.

The next historical period cited by supporters of the theory of the priority of the interests of the Russian population in the state structure of the Russian Empire is the reigns of Emperors Alexander III and Nicholas II. As the main arguments, the policies of “Russification” and the doctrine of “Russia for Russians and in a Russian way” (associated with Alexander III) are typically mentioned, as well as the emergence of Russian national movements (and later, parties that for the first time implemented political representation for Russians) after the monopoly on political activity was abandoned by Nicholas II’s samoderzhavie. In addition, reference is often made to the personal attachment of both emperors to Russian culture and their confrontations with Western Europe in foreign policy.

Without disputing the emperors’ commitment to Russian tradition and culture, as well as notable economic achievements and a number of successful reforms during various periods of their reigns (including Bunge’s tax reform and Stolypin’s agrarian reform), one cannot agree with the position that the interests of the Russian population were the priority of state policy, or that the status of Russians in the state fundamentally changed compared to previous historical periods. Equally, criticism of various aspects of state policy persisted—and even intensified—from the side of representatives of the Russian population (Russian national movements and parties). The ultimate acute political crisis of the regime culminated in the February Revolution, followed by the Bolshevik coup and the collapse of the Russian Empire. The following are several historical circumstances that clearly characterize the above statements.

Firstly, the slogan “Russia for Russians and in a Russian way” remained nothing more than an unofficial political slogan. Autocracy—which did not provide any participation for the Russian population in the state’s affairs—lasted until 1905. Echoing, to a certain degree, the American foreign policy “Monroe Doctrine” of US domination in one’s hemishpere in slogan “America for Americans,” this slogan was fundamentally different in concept; it was domestic and chiefly reflected Alexander III’s desire to concentrate on internal processes at the expense of external political activity and, perhaps partly, as a response to nationalism in the Caucasus, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic provinces. In any case, the high-level proclaimed call of “Russia for Russians” at that time implied discrimination against Russians in Russia.

Secondly, the policy of “Russification” was exclusively aimed at strengthening the integration of national border regions, such as Poland, Finland, and the Baltic provinces, and did nothing to improve the situation of the Russian population.

Thirdly, in 1890 the Zemstvo Reform of 1864 was revised. Government control over zemstvos was increased and the principle of universal estate-based elections was altered. This inevitably led to a reduction in the elective and estate-based components of the zemstvo institutions. Essentially, the only mechanism of self-governance for the Russian population was subjected to a strict review and its rights were curtailed.

Fourthly, the Supreme Manifesto on the Improvement of the State Order, published on October 17, 1905, declared political rights and freedoms for both the dominant Russian population and all other national minorities alike. Among the newly forming political parties, which strove to elect representatives to the newly established parliament (the State Duma), along with Russian nationalist parties, overtly anti-national parties were created (or legalized)—primarily the Bolsheviks. In other words, there was no priority given to the interests of the Russian population during the most important socio-political reform in history (the transition from autocracy to a constitutional monarchy with a parliament possessing legislative initiative).

Fifthly, even though Russian nationalist parties (for example, the Russian People's Union) remained monarchist loyalist organizations, they regularly criticized not only Stolypin’s agrarian reform and the modernization program of the economy or the admission of Jews to the State Duma, but also the state’s inability to “actually implement the freedoms and personal inviolability granted by the Manifesto of October 17, that is, to shield individuals from the arbitrariness and violence of the authorities.”

From 1917 to 1991.

Perhaps the utmost degree of incompetence and doctrinaire stance of some international experts on Russia is revealed in their perception of this historical period through the prism of “historical continuity” between the new state established by the Bolsheviks and the Russian Empire. Complementing this perspective are the utterly absurd, fantastical constructions regarding the USSR as a “restored, re-created historical Russia” propagated not only by marginal contemporary public figures of a certain stripe but also by perfectly respectable representatives of the nomenklatura of the current political regime.

There is no need to expend effort on the obvious counterarguments to refute such divisive illusions—it is enough to quote the strategist of the Bolshevik coup, the head of the government of the new state and the de facto founder of the USSR, Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), who in his speech of October 2, 2020, summarized:
“The old has been destroyed, as it should have been destroyed; it represents a heap of ruins, as it should have been turned into a heap of ruins. The ground is cleared, and upon this ground the young communist generation must build a communist society.”

The Russian population was the primary victim of the established political regime of the new state. In his 2009 work, renowned historian K. M. Aleksandrov writes:
“The Leninist Party set itself against the majority of the Russian population. On September 19, 1918, the Petrograd newspaper ‘Severnaya Kommuna’ published a statement by a member of the Central Committee of the RKP(b) and chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, G.E. Zinoviev: ‘We must win ninety out of a hundred of the people residing in Soviet Russia. With the others we cannot negotiate – they must be eliminated.’ Hence, a bitter civil war was inevitable. The direct casualties in the years 1917–1922 are estimated at 12 million people, with only some 600–700 thousand (5–6%) constituting battle losses on the opposing sides.”

In the same work, K. M. Aleksandrov estimates the number of direct victims of Stalin’s repressive policies in the 1930s–1940s—caused by mass resistance to the Soviet regime (including 55 open armed peasant rebellions) due to the forcible creation of collective farms, deportations, and dekulakization—at approximately 10 million people. (This estimate is largely corroborated by researchers such as S. N. Prokopovich, S. Maksudov, E. M. Andreev, V. V. Tsaplin, N. A. Aralovets, and B. S. Pushkaryov.)

From 1991 to the Present.

After the collapse of the USSR, upon its ruins—quite objectively, in large part through the efforts of a certain section of the communist nomenklatura—a new state formation emerged: the Russian Federation. Its political structure has undergone significant transformations over the past decades. With few exceptions, one common feature is the characterization of the head of the current political regime of the Russian Federation as a “Russian nationalist.” This designation can be found in journalistic materials, in lengthy reports by international experts and political scientists, and even occasionally in speeches by members of the ruling nomenklatura (who, it should be noted, often qualify the term with the epithet “proper”). Indeed, Putin himself frequently declares in public, almost in an urbi et orbi fashion: “I am the greatest nationalist in Russia,” “I feel Russian to the core,” “Medvedev is no less a Russian nationalist than I am,” and “I am the most proper, the real nationalist—and the most effective.” Moreover, at times this orator makes even more conceptual statements such as:
“What is good for the Russian person is also in the national interests of Russia, and indeed of all the peoples of the RF. But the point is not to promote these national interests at any cost, but rather the question is how to do so.”

One might think that we are observing a clearly formulated position and thus need to concur with the opinions of the experts and the nomenklatura. However, any unprejudiced researcher will be confounded when encountering other public speeches by Putin in which he makes statements (sometimes irrational and unfounded, at other times absurd) that fundamentally alter the perception of his views:
“Those who say ‘Russia is for Russians’—you know, it is hard not to characterize these people either as dishonest individuals who do not understand what they say and are simply fools, or as provocateurs, because Russia is a multiethnic country;”
“Cave-dwelling nationalism—the slogan ‘Russia only for Russians’—only harms Russians, harms Russia, and contributes to its internal destabilization;”
“I am deeply convinced that attempts to preach ideas aimed at constructing a monoethnic Russian state contradict our thousand-year history. Moreover, this is the shortest road to the destruction of the Russian people and Russian statehood;”
“The Russian people are the state-forming element—in effect, of Russia. The great mission of Russians is to unite and consolidate civilization. Through language, culture, and what Fyodor Dostoevsky defined as ‘universal responsiveness,’ we must unite Russian Armenians, Russian Azerbaijanis, Russian Germans, Russian Tatars—unite them into a type of state-civilization where there are no ‘ethnic others’ and the criterion for belonging is defined by a shared culture and common values;”
“The core that binds the fabric of this unique civilization is the Russian people, Russian culture. It is precisely this core that various provocateurs and our adversaries will, with all their might, attempt to tear away from Russia under the pretext of their spurious talk of the right of Russians to self-determination, of ‘racial purity,’ of the need to ‘finish the business of 1991 and completely destroy the empire that weighs upon the Russian people—to ultimately force people to destroy their own homeland with their own hands.’”
“Unlike other, older or rapidly aging nations, we are still on the rise; we are a relatively young nation. We have an endless genetic code—one that is based on the mixing of blood, if you will, in a straightforward, popular sense;”
“You said ‘Russians’… But who are Russians? Practically none existed before the 9th century; the Russian people gradually formed out of many ethnic groups … based on a common market, the authority of a prince, a single language and faith that later became one.”

What, then, is the reason for such dichotomy? And what does the concept of the “proper nationalist” mean?

A researcher from Charles University convincingly responds to these questions:
“Putin’s aim is to transform a federative state into a centralized and polyethnic (multiplex) one. In this context, it is not surprising that he defines nationalism as the principal threat to the system he is creating, because nationalism implies peoples’ striving for political subjectivity and the defence of their interests. And such subjectivity and the struggle by citizens and their communities for their interests are incompatible with the very essence of the current regime. In Putin’s worldview there is room for ethnic groups or tribes and their distinctiveness, but there is no place for modern nations, which emerge from the struggle for their rights. And this applies not only to non-Russian peoples but to the Russian people themselves, which, according to Putin, are meant to be dissolved into a ‘multiethnic state’ and serve as its unifying force—a “state-forming people,” but not a nation with its own interests.”

In other words, Putin de facto regards Russians as a kind of community whose very existence is owed solely to the state and to “the authority of the prince.” Putin attempts to create a phantasmagorical picture of reality in which there was no modern era and no difference between the 21st and the 8th centuries, refusing to view Russians as a fully formed, subjectively self-aware nation—instead, as a “tribe” that can be moulded by “the authority of a prince,” based on a “common market” and a “single language,” into a new people. Predictably, the self-proclaimed “prince” sees the primary threat to his plans in Russian nationalism, which stands for the defence of the rights and interests of Russians. In the political system he has constructed, the only “proper” nationalist can be none other than himself—the one who creates a “young nation” by “mixing blood.”

The best confirmation of the correctness of these conclusions is found in public statements by the apologists of the current political regime. It is worth noting the utterances of the least significant actors, because in an effort to underline their exclusive loyalty they often resort to the most grotesque and expressive formulations. For example, Alexandr Dugin, building a phantasmagoric construct that Russian nationalism is largely geopolitical nationalism, writes:
“Beyond the borders of Russia, in the CIS, many millions of Russians live. And on the territory of Russia—there are millions of non-Russians. But both the Russians and non-Russians of the post-Soviet space are essentially one people, one culture, one nation. The only way to unite the people in this situation would be not an appeal to the nation—in any understanding of the term, and certainly not to an abstract and liberal civil society, but rather to an Empire;”
and also,
“We are fighting nationalism, but we must not turn into nationalists ourselves. We are an Empire both as heirs of the monarchy and as successors of the USSR. We are more than a nation.”

If these quotes may seem excessively eccentric, then Dugin’s panegyrics in praise of Putin attest that the limits of hyperbolic eulogy are entirely absent:
“It is high time to endow Vladimir Putin with a new status, because he is more than a president. The presidency is a formal status; Putin is the savior of the fatherland, saving it from the inevitable collapse caused by the liberal reforms of the ’90s. Therefore, I would support the canonization of Putin as the Tsar of Russia. And at the general assembly of the Russian nation we will bestow upon Vladimir Vladimirovich the status due to him as Tsar, the status of the leader of the people. Whether he is a president in the legal sense or not is secondary. He is the leader of our people, he saved Russia and the Russians in the most complex situations and must continue to do his work;”
and
“We need to move from Putin to Putinism.”

It is entirely predictable that the above set of ideologues inevitably led to the formation of a state system that systematically suppresses the interests of the Russian population, in some respects reducing Russians to the status of second-class citizens. This situation, in turn, could not but give rise to resistance among a segment of the Russian population, which sometimes takes the form of open confrontation with the authorities and their nomenklatura. Below is a series of circumstances, events, and facts that objectively and impartially characterize the realities of the current state of the Russian population.

Firstly, the Russian population completely lacks independent political subjectivity (institutional representation) in the Russian Federation. Russians constitute over 80% of the Russian Federation’s population. According to the current Constitution, the source of power in the Russian Federation is an abstract “multiethnic people” (while the actual mechanisms of influence, such as elections or referenda, are in any case subordinate to the state). Russians lack national-state autonomy (which is especially absurd given the proclaimed federal structure of the state), while 27 of the 85 federal subjects are national republics or national autonomous oblasts (for the purposes of this article, the latest changes made to the RF Constitution on October 6, 2022, are not considered). In 13 national republics, Russians are a minority (in Chechnya and Ingushetia – about 1%, in Dagestan – just over 3%). It is well known that in national formations there is disproportionate representation of Russians in state bodies; for example, in Tatarstan, 40% of Russians are represented by less than a quarter of the republican-level ministries, as well as the fact of increasing subsidies to national republics (primarily Dagestan, Chechnya, and Yakutia) at the expense of reducing support for regions in the European part of the RF. The precedent “case of Nikita Zhuravel” (a resident of Volgograd, illegally transferred by the central authorities for torture and abuse by the authorities of Chechnya) vividly illustrates, on the one hand, the extent of the Russian population’s lack of rights and the complete absence of any form of institutional protection—including even the basic guarantees of life and health—and, on the other hand, clearly demonstrates the exceptional preferences that the political regime grants to certain national republics. At present, there is not a single political party—even one controlled by the authorities—that would, even formally, claim in its program to represent the interests of the Russian population. The occasional thesis that the Russian population is represented through the central government is as false and absurd as the earlier-mentioned thesis about the “organic unification of the sovereign with the people.”

Secondly, the targeted political and criminal persecution of Russian nationalist organizations, as well as their leaders and activists, is an important characteristic of the existing system of power in the RF over more than two decades. As early as April 2002, President Vladimir Putin initiated significant tightening of legislation related to the norms of so-called “violation of equality.” On his initiative, new concepts were introduced in the criminal law of the RF— “extremism,” “extremist community,” “organization of an extremist community,” “organization of extremist activities,” and others related to the now notorious Article 282 of the RF Criminal Code. In the first few years of enforcing Article 282, several hundred people were convicted, and over the following two years—about a thousand more. Even the loyalist media of that period could already, in their materials, write about the practice of prosecution under Article 282, stating essentially:
“In any case, it is implied that this article is directed against the ethnic majority of our country—the people who actively defended and continue to defend the right of Russians to be the masters of their land.”
and also:
“… practically everyone convicted under it (Art. 282) had ties to Russian socio-political organizations.”
It is not surprising that behind this Criminal Code article—by means of which the political regime punished its critics for ideological transgressions—a non-official name “the Russian Article” became fixed. By 2018, according to the judicial department of the RF Supreme Court, no fewer than four thousand people had been convicted under Article 282. In 2010, with the recognition of the Slavic Union movement as an extremist organization and its subsequent ban, a political campaign to ban Russian nationalist communities began. Over the following year, the “Movement Against Illegal Organization” was also declared extremist and banned, followed by the ethnic association “Russians” being labeled extremist and banned. The authorities, just in case, even liquidated their own spoiler project—the “Rodina” party—which had been created by system political technologists in an attempt to appeal to Russian nationalists. It is important to emphasize that the full-scale repression against Russian nationalists became, chronologically, the first full-scale persecution of the regime’s opponents. As the wheels of repression accelerated, for the first time in modern history the regime began to apply violence on a large scale against its critics. For the first time, the regime employed torture and even extrajudicial killings (for example, allegedly during resistance at the time of arrest) against its political opponents. This, evidently, could not but lead to the radicalization of a segment of Russian national resistance.

Thirdly, the socio-economic inequality in the Russian Federation—affecting, first and foremost, the vast majority of the Russian population (comprising over 80% of the total)—has reached truly epic proportions. The most widely accepted and common statistical indicator in economics for assessing income inequality, the gap between the rich and the poor, or inequality of consumption within a country’s population, is the Gini coefficient, developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912. According to estimates by leading international banks (for example, UBS) and specialized, independent international agencies (for example, the World Inequality Lab), in recent decades the Russian Federation has ranked among the top ten worst-performing countries (out of 175) according to the Gini index. The worst figures are observed only in a few African countries, Myanmar, Bahrain, Mexico, Cambodia, Yemen, and Peru. In the RF, the top 1% owns 56.4% of all wealth in the economy (in comparison, this figure is 24.0% in France). Furthermore, the top 1% in the RF accounts for 23.76% of all national income (for comparison: in Australia – 9.91%, in Belarus – 8.66%, and in Norway – 6.87%), and, even more shockingly, the top 0.1% accounts for 10% of national income. But even that is not the most curious fact. According to Forbes, among the 125 richest people in the Russian Federation, no more than 50% are ethnic Russians. In other words, statistically, while the combined Russian population (including both the super-rich and the wealthy, which together make up over 80% of the total population) accounts for only about 62% of all wealth, the populations of other nationalities—which constitute 20% of the total—account for 38% of the wealth. That is, on average, the aggregate Russian population is about 2.5 times poorer than the aggregate population of other nationalities.

Fourthly, the demographic situation of the Russian population in the Russian Federation is described by academic scholars exclusively in terms such as “catastrophe” and “tragedy.” The demographic catastrophe of Russians is a phenomenon even in the context of the global trend of declining birth rates caused by what is known as the “demographic transition” (a period marked by declines in both birth and death rates leading to generational replacement). In discussions of the tragedy of Russian demography, the scientific term “Russian Cross” has even emerged—a unique demographic phenomenon characterized by a sharp excess of mortality over the falling birth rate. This means that in the Russian population not only is the decline in birth rates accelerating, but mortality is rising at a very high pace (in contrast to the global trend of falling mortality). It seems that in an attempt to divert attention from this tragic issue, the current political regime in 2006 took certain measures after which the term “Russian Cross” was replaced by the neutral “demographic cross.” Obviously, the attempt to sweep the problem under the rug has, in fact, exacerbated the catastrophe. According to the Federal State Statistics Service of the RF, the birth rates in April 2023 were the lowest since the beginning of the 21st century, and in April 2022 the birth rate corresponded to the levels during the German occupation in World War II. Over the 2020–2022 period, due to the COVID epidemic, war, and emigration, population loss exceeded the previously established figure by 2 million people. The life expectancy for 15-year-old males during this period fell by nearly five years—to a level comparable to that on Haiti. As a result of mobilization and emigration, the number of women exceeded that of men by 10 million. It is especially noteworthy that, according to the Higher School of Economics for 2025, the highest birth rates—around 2.5 (even exceeding the level of replacement)—in the Russian Federation are observed only in the national republics and national autonomous regions. The leaders in this ranking are Chechnya, Tuva, Kabardino-Balkaria, and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. In contrast, referring to the low-birth rate regions, researchers from the HSE note (using euphemisms, in politically correct language) that “a very low birth rate (below 1.3) is observed in 33 regions, most of which are located in the European part of the RF. These are the Central and Northwestern Federal Districts. The birth rate there has been consistently low for a long time”. The demographic catastrophe might have been partly mitigated if the state authorities had, even to a small extent, employed the obvious means of supporting the Russian population—for example, through one-time payments. An independent expert and demographer, who formerly served for many years in the state statistical system, asserts that even payments in the range of 1.5–2 million Rubles would have significantly alleviated the dramatic situation:
“If such payments were introduced now for a second and third child—requiring approximately 1.2 trillion Rubles annually (which is 11.5 times less than the RF defence budget, three times less than expenditures on law enforcement agencies, 3.5 times less than what the Central Bank of the RF spent at one time in 2018 to support one of its puppet banks, and also less than the total salary expenses of state officials over three years)—and if the birth rate were raised by 10–15%, Russia would become a leader among developed countries.”

Fifthly, the living conditions of the Russian population over the past decades have led to the phenomenon of the formation of an enormous Russian national community (“Russian emigration” or “Russian diaspora”) outside the Russian Federation. As of 2025, according to various estimates (including those by the United Nations and other demographic studies), more than 20 million Russians (with some estimates reaching 30 million at the high end) reside outside the RF on a permanent basis. Data indicate that over the past two decades the Russian diaspora has steadily grown (according to most estimates, over 1 million during 2023–2024). According to the UN, in absolute numbers the Russian diaspora is the third largest in the world, behind only the Indian and Mexican diasporas, and even surpassing the Chinese diaspora. This position is especially striking if one considers the differences in population sizes—India and China each have over 1.4 billion people, compared to 145 million in the RF. Furthermore, if one trusts the UN data, the Russian diaspora accounts for about 10% of all migrants worldwide, whose total number is estimated at over 280 million. Clearly, the current political, economic, and social trends shaped by the current regime in the RF lead to an increased outflow of the Russian population. It should also be noted that despite the initiatives declared by the authorities regarding engagement with the Russian diaspora (ranging from a caricatured World Russian People’s Assembly to a state program for the resettlement of compatriots) and despite the actions of Western governments—which have significantly worsened the situation of the Russian diaspora through ill-conceived sanctions—the negative attitude of emigrated Russians toward the regime in the RF remains unchanged.

Sixthly, over the past two decades the RF political regime has consistently encouraged and actively facilitated an explosive growth of immigration—both legal and illegal—of foreign citizens, mainly from Central Asian countries. This large-scale phenomenon, occurring simultaneously with the demographic catastrophe and the mass emigration of Russians, essentially represents “substitute immigration,” where the declining Russian population is being replaced by foreigners. Demographic changes of truly historical proportions are taking place. According to official data from 2014, the RF ranks first in Europe and second in the world (after the USA) by the number of labour migrants. Official statistics indicate that annually 2–3.5 million foreign citizens arrive for employment purposes. Precise public data on the number of legal and illegal labour migrants do not exist—the state makes every effort to conceal the true scale of the phenomenon and its consequences (for example, regularly initiating draft laws banning the mention of a criminal’s nationality in the media). Estimates from the media, state statistics, and law enforcement agencies often differ by several multiples. Nevertheless, the following figures can be cited: since 2008, between 11 and 15 million foreign migrants have been residing in the RF (with the highest estimates reaching 32.6 million), among which the number of illegal migrants has varied at different times between 3 and 6 million (with the highest estimates reaching 15 million). As of 2020 (according to the UN), the RF occupies fourth place in the world in absolute numbers of migrants (11.58 million people), behind only the USA, Germany, and Saudi Arabia. According to the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs, between January and October 2022, 12.76 million migrants entered the RF—3.5 million more than during the same period in 2021. Despite recent government rhetoric about supposedly tightening immigration policies—especially in light of the proclaimed multi-fold increase in migrant-related crime, including one of the bloodiest terrorist attacks in modern history in Moscow carried out by radical Islamists from Tajikistan, in which 145 people died and 551 were wounded—the migration inflow from January to November 2024 was record high over the past 26 years. There is one more aspect of “substitute immigration” in the RF that is rarely discussed. Over the past 20 years, a process commonly referred to in historical literature as “Islamization” has been underway. According to Islamic sources, in 1994 Muslims constituted about 8% (or by some estimates, 5.5%) of the RF population; by 2000 the share of Muslims had approached 11%; and by 2019 Muslims accounted for almost 14% (or according to some data—16%) of the population. As early as 2009, Islamic sources proudly reported that the RF had become the European country with the largest number of people practicing Islam, also claiming that there were more Muslims in the RF than in Jordan and Libya, and that of the 38 million Muslims in Europe, 16 million lived in the RF. A subsequent important milestone occurred in 2014, when the Chairman of the State Duma’s Education Committee, Vladislav Nikonov (who simultaneously serves as Chairman of the “Russian World” Foundation), speaking at an international Islamic forum, declared enthusiastically:
“Moscow is not only the largest Muslim city in Russia but also the city with the largest Muslim population in Europe. Today, Moscow is home to one and a half million Muslims.”
In 2018, the Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Sheikh Ravil Gainutdin, told a Turkish news agency:
“The number of the Russian Ummah (in Arabic—the religious community of Muslims) has reached 25 million and continues to grow dynamically. The number of Muslims increases not only because of arrivals and relocations from the Central Asian republics but also because birth rates in Muslim families are higher. Moreover, the life expectancy of Muslims is above the national average.” He also noted:
“Most Muslims live in the Moscow region and in other major metropolises such as St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, etc.”
These remarkable statements could not fail to please President Vladimir Putin, who declared at a meeting with international media:
“We are not against the growth of the Islamic population; on the contrary, we are glad that this is happening in the RF. In some of our republics, predominantly those with a Muslim population, the birth rate is very good—we are very pleased.”
And, of course, it is impossible not to quote the statements made at a 2019 State Duma conference by two important representatives of the Muslim community. The aforementioned Head of the Council of Muftis and Chairman of the Presidium of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European part of the RF, Sheikh Ravil Gainutdin, stated:
“According to specialists—whom we do not doubt—in about fifteen years, Muslims may constitute up to 30% of Russia’s population. Such forecasts are generally confirmed by practice. For example, in 2018, on the day of Kurban Bayram in the capital region, over 320,000 Muslims attended prayer according to official law enforcement data—and these records are updated every year.”
In turn, the First Deputy Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia, Damir Mukhatdinov, noted that according to some experts’ estimates, by 2050 the share of Muslims could reach 50%. Mukhatdinov reminded that the highest birth rates in Russia are recorded in Muslim regions. Among the migrants needed by the country for economic development, according to him, the majority come from Muslim countries.
“The objective picture—whether one likes it or not—is that both qualitatively and quantitatively, the number of Muslims will grow. Yesterday’s migrants have entered schools, kindergartens, universities, have received quality education—and this will be the full spectrum of our state.”
What could be a brighter future for the Russian Federation…

Seventhly, at the present moment an armed uprising is underway among the most active segment of Russian national resistance against the current political regime. Subjected to political and criminal persecution by the authorities, completely deprived of any possibility—due both to state censorship and the prohibition of rallies and assemblies—to publicly declare their political position and dissent against the prevailing socio-economic trends, activists of Russian national communities have been forced to resort to the last remaining forms of political activity. Criticism of government actions on social media, unsanctioned gatherings, and direct-action demonstrations (such as street propaganda in the form of graffiti) for a time became the only means for a part of the Russian population to express its discontent with the actions of the regime. In response, the state has intensified repression (freezing of bank accounts, arrests of all property, long prison sentences for social media reposts) and used illegal violence against activists (intimidation of relatives, torture and abuse, extrajudicial killings). All of this is evident and has led to the next logical stage in the confrontation between the current political regime and the active part of the Russian national movement, which deems the state policy contrary to the interests of the Russian population. At the earliest opportunity—in February 2022, for instance—dozens of Russian nationalists took up arms and undertook, yet another attempt in Russian history, an anti-government armed uprising. The above confrontation vividly illustrates the life and struggle of the Russian nationalist Anton Zyryanov, who “played one of the key roles in establishing the Russian Volunteer Corps” and fell in battle in early spring 2025, widely covered in the media (including his own interviews). Anton, who was born in Perm in 1995, spent his entire conscious life under the current regime. As a young man, he joined the Russian national community activists in his hometown. In interviews, Anton states that this was connected with his disagreement with police arbitrariness, social inequality, the replacement of Russians by migrants, his opposition to Putin’s policies in general, and most importantly, his desire for a better fate for the Russian population. His participation, along with that of other activists, in direct-action protests (such as street graffiti, the torching of police vehicles, buildings of the prosecutor’s office, and the branch of Putin’s “United Russia” party) led to his arrest by the FSB and torture—including electric shock torture—and later, in 2019, on the defendant’s chair where he faced a five-year prison sentence. Anton escaped on the day his sentence was pronounced and crossed on foot the border between the RF and Ukraine. After the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine, Anton, together with a number of his like-minded compatriots—Russian nationalists—took up arms to continue his fight against the regime on a new stage. Various estimates exist regarding the number of Russian volunteers currently fighting against the RF political regime. Vladimir Putin mentioned a figure of about 1,500 during a raid in the Belgorod region in spring 2023, while media reports estimate the number in the several-thousands. Regular media reports indicate the emergence of new volunteer groups from the RF joining the armed resistance. In any event, it is obvious that the armed Russian nationalists (those who have resolved to take a step that will change their lives forever, leaving no other option but the path of resistance) represent only the tip of the spear of that segment of the Russian population which seeks a better fate for itself and for future generations.

In conclusion.

This study convincingly demonstrates that there was not a single historical period in which the prioritization of the interests of the Russian population determined state policy. It should be noted that the historical period covering the times from the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the Russian Tsardom, and the Russian Empire (up to Alexander II’s “Great Reforms”) was characterized on one hand by the presence of the shameful serfdom—a de facto slavery for a significant part of the Russian peasant population—and, on the other hand, by an objective improvement in living conditions, opportunities for social development, and the expansion of personal freedoms for certain strata of the Russian population (from the Cossacks and urban dwellers to the nobility). In the short historical interval between Alexander II’s reforms, following centuries of suppressed revolts, the abolition of serfdom, and the Bolshevik coup, the Russian population for the first time acquired—even if very limited—subjectivity: first in the form of regional economic self-government (through the zemstvo institution) and soon thereafter through full political representation in the form of parliamentary parties. It should also be emphasized that many other national groups gained a number of freedoms and autonomous rights significantly earlier than Russians. Importantly, the state, or rather the sovereigns, did not so much ignore the specific interests of the Russian population as they simply preferred to assume that the absolute monarch was endowed with an intimate knowledge of what was beneficial for his subjects. That is, in the eyes of the autocrat—his will was the ultimate manifestation of the interests of Russians. And in that sense, any deviation from the sovereign’s political will for the good of Russians was met with extremely harsh repression. Since no form of dissent other than rebellion was available until October 1905 against the monarch’s political will regarding the good of Russians, the number of these uprisings during the described historical period numbered in the thousands. The retaliatory repressions were always characterized by utmost cruelty and were applied both to the organizers and to the participants of the revolts, regardless of their previous merits before the Tsar and the Fatherland.

The new state that emerged on the ruins of the crushed Russian Empire—the USSR—was an anti-national state of a new formation whose primary task was not the public good of the population but the implementation of a global communist revolution. To implement this task, the creation of a new society—Soviet people—was envisaged. Due to this, the USSR in essence could not prioritize the interests of Russians or any other nationality. The state power in the USSR used mass repressions of biblical severity against that segment of the Russian population which tried to fight for its survival and existence.

The modern political regime of the Russian Federation consciously denies the Russian population its political subjectivity.

State rhetoric defines the role of Russians solely as the state-forming people and denies them their own rights and interests apart from those of the state.

Moreover, the system of power deliberately, and in some aspects criminally through inaction, suppresses the interests of Russians—who comprise the absolute majority (over 80%) of the RF population—creates and sustains a negative socio-economic disproportionality for them, permits a demographic catastrophe, encourages substitute immigration, and represses thought crimes.

One might wonder what purpose and why the political regime needs this; but unexpectedly, political scientist Alexey Chaadayev—who served in various state positions for over 15 years (from a referent at the Presidential Administration to an advisor to the Chairman of the State Duma), and is the author of the books Putin. His Ideology and Putin. Our Values—explained this and wrote at the end of March 2025:
“…the majority trades away political subjectivity in favor of ‘stability’ and a certain flow of very measured benefits, yet keeps the option open to call this tacit bargain into question at any moment. Accordingly, I assert—and I weigh all my more than thirty years of experience in Russian political technologies as evidence—that all this functions properly only in a situation when the political passivity of the majority persists as the dominant mode of stability.”
In other words, in order to preserve and consolidate the current regime, the “bosses” (to use Chaadayev’s terminology) effectively eliminate political competition—and more broadly, public policy in the RF—leaving the Russian population only with three options:

1. Remain completely politically passive and not resist the demographic catastrophe, social inequality, impoverishment due to inflation and rising bank rates, substitute immigration, or Islamization;

2. Simply emigrate; or

3. Revolt.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that there is a segment of the Russian population that chooses uprising.

Remarkably, while other nations over past centuries have been forming their identities and establishing the principles of nationalism—with states undergoing reforms and developing national policies—the Russian Empire, the Bolshevik dictatorship of the USSR, and the current “Eurasian” political regime have essentially remained tied to pre-modern times, when under “the authority of a prince” there were tribes rather than nations, and priorities were determined by statism and dynastic interests.

Can it be said that the current state is the worst for Russians over the entire historical period under review? Obviously, the horrors of serfdom and the tens of millions of victims of Bolshevik totalitarianism should tip the scales of history. But we live here and now. Even the most terrible crimes of past centuries cannot justify the silent endurance of injustice and humiliation today. Just as the greatest achievements of bygone eras should not hold back our present aspirations to achieve something better.

Илья Ильин
Ilya Ilyin

20 Апреля 2025 года
April 20, 2025

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