‘Russian World’ is an empty term

When the general public becomes aware of the term ‘Russian world' / ’Russkiy mir,’ they will likely come across many articles that treat it as a concrete doctrine. A doctrine that is both expansionist and nationalist at its core, it regards all states with a Russian presence as rightful targets for eventual absorption into Russia. These states can accept the ‘Russian world’ and gradually be Russified, erasing their previous identity before integrating into Russia. After all, why is it called ‘Russkiy mir’ and not ‘Rossiyskiy/Russovian mir,’ if it is not about ethnic Russians? It is presented as a manifestation of Russian identity and what enables Russia to be a distinct civilisation. But that is only one possible interpretation, with each further evaluation undermining what it truly signifies. As explained in 2015 by Marlene Laruelle, ‘Russian world’ is merely a floating signifier, where the original users of the term had nothing structural or consistent from its first use in the 1990s, with narratives changing over the years. This article will explore additional details about the initial conditions before the term was created, and how the Kremlin adopted and explained it domestically.

Russian (speaking) world and methodologian origin of the term

Before addressing the origin of the term ‘Russian world’ and its original meaning, a foundation point for an idea must be examined, seeing how mouldable the term is. The term originated from an organisation of the Moscow Methodological Circle and the philosophy of its founder, Georgy Shchedrovitsky. Had he died later than 1994, perhaps he would have been known more among the English-speaking world, or even compared to Scientologists. His movement of System-Thinking-Activity methodology was created to provide a systemic way to solve any problem you want to. For Georgy, thinking is a primary part of activity that precedes knowledge. A methodologian, when encountering a plant, would start thinking about how to take care of it, not what species it is. A quasi-scientific discipline at best, methodologians strive to continuously develop new ways of thinking through organisational-activity games to continue developing new logical models and methods, also teaching that way of thinking to new members.

The Moscow Methodological Circle was never interested in mass recruitment but aimed for a totalitarian goal. A Marxist expelled from the CPSU, he did not cooperate with other dissidents and kept training party members. Georgy Schedrovitsky believed that a few individuals can change everything in society. Methodologists focused on mobilising elites and intelligentsia, who alone would have the full capacity and knowledge to bring about systemic change. Totalitarianism was seen as a necessity for this, allowing control over social processes and correcting the mistakes the Soviet Union made, in Georgy’s opinion. Georgy thought his approach could give Russia a new edge in competing with other economically developed nations. He also personally believed that Russia is part of Europe and that foreign competition threatens to undermine Europe’s intellectual capacities and impact human culture. With action as the main focus, ultimately, anyone could set and pursue goals without primary concerns for utility or costs.

With such starting conditions for the authors, it would have been reasonable to expect a term filled with abstract methodologian models. However, when Georgy Shchedrovitsky’s son Pyotr and others introduced the term ‘Russian world,’ it was a surprisingly simple and coherent. Their definition of the ‘Russian world’ was a “network structure of large and small communities that think and speak in Russian.” In a post-Soviet world, a symbiotic interaction with the global Russian-speaking diasporas was understood by Pyotr as a path towards the future in a globalised world. Pyotr’s ‘Russian World’ is a break from the technocratic obsession of discarding socio-cultural aspects of society that ailed the late Soviet leadership. It is a way to utilise the global human capital and focus on ‘humanitarian technologies’ (management, sociology, marketing, PR, and media) that ensure society is well-managed, not just economically.

As the methodologian definition of ‘Russian world’ relies on diasporas, it does not mean Russian as an ethnicity but as a multinational people united by language. Had the term Rossiyanin/Russovian not been heavily negatively associated with the Kremlin at that time, it might have been named differently. For them, diasporas are the primary indicator of whether the core of the ‘Russian world,’ the Russian Federation, is acting appropriately as part of the international community. Without independent institutions, the current core is too unstable for the original definition, not to mention the lack of self-reflection and the Kremlin’s focus on the past. An apology to the diaspora would have been a significant step in regaining their trust and cooperation for future projects. The collapse of the methodology is also evident in Kremlin-affiliated figures who used to be connected to the Moscow Methodological Circle but stopped engaging with the organisation afterwards. Without interest in continuous self-improvement to achieve better outcomes, what is happening now cannot be described under the initial definition of the ‘Russian world.’ It had to be redefined, and it was.

Russian Russia’s world, according to the Kremlin

The current understanding of the idea of the ‘Russian world’ was recently summarised by the former assistant of President Putin, Vladislav Surkov. His summary definition is straight to the point: ‘Russian world’ is ‘everywhere there is Russian influence, in one form or another.’ It can be foreign policy, diplomatic, cultural, and military, everything the state of Russia possesses and not the regular people and civil society. Wherever soft and hard power can be projected is the extent of the ‘Russian world’ according to the Kremlin. Just like the Russian Federation, this definition has a historical background from the Soviet Union as the political entity that had states with Moscow as an undisputed leader. Now the interaction with diasporas proceeds only through Kremlin-affiliated organisations and indifference to the diaspora that exists independently. If the state is refusing to acknowledge the situation, invasion is an option, with the current war in Ukraine as the direct evidence. Just as the current constitution proclaims Russia a multinational state, this ‘Russian world’ is equally diverse and multifaith, adaptable to various parts of the world. But while this definition works for the Kremlin, why should the population accept and embrace it? How would it be explained?

‘Project Russia’ as an explanation attempt for a domestic audience

That attempt to explain why was the ‘Project Russia.’ It is a series of four mostly anonymous books that sought to create a new ideology for the Kremlin to restore Russia’s international prestige and stability. When the first book was released in 2005, the common suggestion was that it was a manifesto for restoring the monarchy. With just one book and a promise of further ideas to come, it was a guess in predicting how the project would unfold. However, recently published opinions do not have the benefit of the doubt. With all books being published, it takes a lot of mental stretching to label these books a serious and tangible plan for global domination and dismantling the West. Admitting that the researcher did not read the book nor has commissioned a full translation and relied on computer tools instead, which are not fully reliable yet, should be enough to dismiss it. Describing it as a well-coordinated framework is admitting that they did not read through the books. The nearest equivalent of the official website does not include all books and does not look well-maintained. The number of books printed does not mean that all of them were sold and became bestsellers. With this point established, we may demonstrate what the books are truly about.

‘Project Russia’ begins with bashing the West for destroying the Soviet Union through the introduction of democracy and ‘consumerist ideology.’ The threat continues, and now Russia is under threat of instability and is facing a risk of schism and further fragmentation. The only reason Russia has not collapsed is the continuity of power from the Soviet Union, carried forward through leaders like Yeltsin and Putin, who uphold authoritarian rule as essential for Russia’s survival. Every other way is part of destructive consumerist Western civilisation that advocates for unlimited freedom, only to bring complete extremism of totalitarianism. Hitler and Nazism are described as a climax of Western liberal thought, where total control is a true freedom without restrictions. 

To avoid such horrors of consumerist Nazism, the elites of Russia must create a new ideology that would be impenetrable to it and be accepted by the entire multinational population of Russia. This would explain why the books were sent to key Kremlin figures, to start the formulation and warn them what to focus on. Books conclude that this new Big/Great Idea will create the world order and put Russia in charge of guiding it. One thing that is certain about this idea is that it envisions an authoritarian Russia, with no mention of Religion or Nationalism, just one foundation. This brave new world will have the societal control restored, with it no longer being restricted by faith or cracks in ideology. To create such a perfect idea, ‘Project Russia’ appeals to future elites, encouraging them to work directly for the Kremlin. Joining the opposition is a waste of time at best and a path for state collapse at worst. With only a promise of a solution, it is no surprise that all but one author chose to remain anonymous.

The only confirmed author of Project Russia is Yuri Shalyganov, who is not a major academic or analyst. His claim of being the Institute of Strategic Security director cannot be verified due to a lack of Internet presence in the form of a website and publications. It should not be confused with the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, which does exist. The latest proof of his existence after his post-Project Russia interviews is gardening advice on how the residents of the Moscow region can preserve their harvest, raising doubt that he actively contributed to the Project Russia besides giving it a face. 

Perhaps nowadays, that ‘Great Idea’ is partly realised in the concept of a multipolar world. With Russia declared a separate civilisation, it is claimed that Russia is leading the process against the West; part of that promise is fulfilled. However, the idea of multipolarity does not offer a new ideology to defend Russia against consumerism, which Shalyganov warned about. Currently, Alexander Kharichev/Harichev, a senior official in the Administration of Russia’s President, advocates for a collectivist approach, united in service to the state as a response to consumerism. Essentially, the Kremlin publicly states its aims of nation-building that would make the state the sole decision-maker, leaving the people with no alternative but to serve it. Could he have been one of those anonymous authors, taking his time before he had an ideology to present?

  Among the domestic readers, Project Russia failed to attract a noticeable audience.  VKontakte, Russia’s largest social network, has less than 5000 subscribers, with major discussions at the time of book releases being disappointment in clarity. Theologian Andrey Kuraev was repulsed by the books, pointing out how they see religion and Orthodox Christianity as nothing but a social engineering project, with new plans declared but not developed. Project Russia does not offer prior religious foundations of Orthodox Christianity, nor does it focus on civil society to assist the state in developing new ideas. It suggests an idea that focuses on the esoteric creation of society. An idea that is humanitarian in nature, rejects prior experience, and seeks to engulf society, ultimately mirroring a methodological approach to solving the problems of the Kremlin’s reduced capacities and the rise of civil society.

Not so ‘Russian world’

By examining the definitions advanced by the authors who coined the term, this article has shown how their intended meanings are not always fully grasped or accurately conveyed abroad. What began as a framework for diaspora engagement based on language has since been redefined as a tool of multiethnic state ideology, ignoring the role of nationalism. But the term ‘Russian world’ has been muddled with esoteric elitism, so let it disappear into the confusing history. It is time to propose a new term, Russian Demos, that will mark the focus on the Russian people, where citizens hold power through democratic means and direct it toward the continuous improvement of their lives, not the state controlling them. Such a vision would mark Russia as a place where one actively chooses to be Russian, deriving strength from civic participation that is understood by all and leaves no room for misinterpretation.

P.S. While researching the ‘Project Russia’ book series, a likeness to conclusion of the prior article by RIGRI was found. The fourth book describes current Russia as a feudal state where access to power depends on access to Putin.