6th October 2026

Why Russians in the EU hesitate to protest

Summary outline :

• Limited protest visibility reduces incentives: demonstrations attract modest attention and offer little direct leverage over the Kremlin.
• Russian anti-war protesters lack a clear common symbol: Ukrainian and Russian flags each create problems of identification and interpretation.
• There is no single “Russian diaspora”: citizenship, ethnicity, language and political identity describe different groups rather than one community.
• Legal dependence discourages visibility: many Russian citizens abroad still rely on the state for passports and consular services, creating risks for public opposition.
• Protest turnout is an incomplete measure of opposition: European policy should recognise other forms of anti-war activity and reduce opponents’ dependence on Russian authorities.

The scope of the protests

Following the September 2026 State Duma ‘elections’ in the Russian Federation, debate has resumed over why Russian citizens barely participate in anti-war protests across Europe. Since they are able to demonstrate freely, their limited participation in anti-war protests may be interpreted as indifference or consent. To analytically assess this claim, however, we need to examine both the target audience and the outcomes of protest actions.

Responding to criticism of sanctions relief for oligarchs and the obstacles facing anti-war emigrants, EU Commission spokesperson Arianna Podestà said Russian citizens must decide whether their government supported the war and could act against it within their own country. The same reasoning may be considered applicable to protests outside the Russian Federation.

Unfortunately, this reasoning rests on the assumption that the Russian regime's legitimacy depends on popular support. It presupposes that citizens of the Russian Federation choose who governs them, treating the outcome as that of a democratic election. Curiously, this argument does not correlate with the formal recognition of the elections. It overlooks the distinction between holding citizenship and wielding political power.

Visibility is paramount. Russian media in exile documented recent anti-war protests on 20 September 2026 in cities including Berlin, London, and The Hague. In November 2024, a Russian opposition march in Berlin attracted around 2,000 participants. Although participation was not particularly high, it nonetheless demonstrated the existence of an active audience. If existing demonstrations receive little attention, while public discussion later returns to the claim that Russians do not protest at all, potential participants may reasonably question what another demonstration is supposed to achieve if their actions are effectively ignored. Any protest action outside the Russian Federation provides little leverage to compel the Kremlin to withdraw its troops. Its value may lie in solidarity, networking, or influence on European debates about Russia. Yet organisers must explain how another demonstration will serve those purposes. Otherwise, the opportunity costs of doing something else remain higher than the likely benefits.

The symbols of the protest

Even identifying participants as Russians presents difficulties. A Ukrainian flag expresses solidarity with Ukraine, but it can be carried by a citizen of any country. Carrying the official Russian tricolour risks being taken for support of the Russian invasion. The white-blue-white flag of Russian protesters offers an alternative, although the wider public did not adopt it as a full-scale alternative. Flags associated with Russian military formations fighting for Ukraine represent particular organisations rather than a shared identity for civilian opponents of the war.

Banners can make clear who is protesting and what they stand for. Nevertheless, Russian participants are often expected to demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine while remaining recognisable as Russians. This creates a visibility problem, particularly for protests intended to represent a distinct Russian anti-war position. It is not always clear which symbols Russians should use to express their position: Ukrainian symbols may emphasise solidarity with Ukraine, while Russian symbols may be associated with the state they oppose.

Who counts as part of the Russian diaspora?

Rihards Kols, a Member of the European Parliament, has invoked ‘3 million Russians in Europe’ when criticising the absence of sustained mass protests. But who does this category include? Citizenship, ethnicity, language and family origins describe different populations. People with roots in Russia or the Soviet Union are not automatically recent emigrants from the Russian Federation. Nor does a citizen of any European state with Russian roots necessarily maintain a political connection with Moscow.

The Russian distinction between ‘Russkiy’ (ethnic Russian) and ‘Rossiyanin’ (civic Russian identity, or ‘Russovian’) matters here. The former denotes ethnic identity; the latter denotes citizenship of a multinational federation. Of those, about two-thirds of Russian Federation citizens who applied for asylum in Germany in 2023 were from Chechnya. A shared passport therefore does not establish a shared ethnic identity or a single political community. Grouping everyone into a single Russian ‘diaspora’ obscures differences that shape both self-identification and willingness to mobilise.

It is also inconsistent to assume that such a diaspora has an inherent political tie to the Russian Federation. If such a connection were automatic, one would expect mobilisation in support of the Kremlin. Where such mobilisation is absent, it should count against the assumption of automatic loyalty. Neither silence nor origin establishes an individual’s position on the war.

Legal threats

More consequential than identity is the legal position of those who hold only Russian citizenship. Emigrating for work, study, or family reasons does not provide the same protection as refugee recognition. A person may oppose the war while remaining dependent on Russian authorities for a passport and other documents. Depending on the host country’s requirements, those documents can be important for maintaining residence or applying for naturalisation.

Since 2022 and until April 2025, only 349 Russian men aged 18 to 45 received refugee status, subsidiary protection, or protection against deportation in Germany, the largest EU state. This figure reminds us that not all Russians are under protection in Europe. Everyone else does not receive secure protection from authorities.

Legislation adopted by the State Duma on 22 July 2026 makes this dependence particularly relevant. The measures provide for restrictions on consular services, including passport renewal, for people abroad whom the authorities regard as evading punishment. The provisions cover criminal convictions and certain unpaid administrative penalties, including those imposed for ‘discrediting’ the armed forces.

Participation in a demonstration does not automatically trigger these restrictions. The concern is the possible sequence: public identification, prosecution, a judgment and subsequent restrictions. For someone whose only passport is Russian, even an uncertain risk can influence the decision to appear in photographs outside an embassy. Distance from Russian territory does not remove the state’s ability to exert pressure by controlling documents.

A person could retain Russian nationality ‘de jure’ while losing practical access to documents and consular assistance. The difficulties would depend on the host country’s rules and available alternatives. Recognised refugees can depend less on their country of nationality, though they still face risks. Different legal positions produce different calculations about public visibility.

How to ‘see’ more protests

These considerations do not remove the responsibility to oppose aggression. They explain why attending demonstrations is an inadequate measure of whether that responsibility is being met. Support for Ukraine can also involve assisting displaced people or sustained research and advocacy. Assess such work alongside public protest.

The Commission spokesperson’s argument therefore calls for a practical response. If European institutions expect Russians to act against the war, they must acknowledge the constraints on that action, including those that persist abroad. Opposition organisers need clear objectives, while European governments should provide ID alternatives for people facing political persecution. Leaving opponents dependent on the state they are expected to challenge allows the Kremlin to retain influence over their decisions. European policy should help reduce that dependence.