Russians and Islam: The Collapse of the "New Historical Community"
Table of Contents
Introduction
1.1 Subject of the ResearchHistorical Aspects of the Coexistence of Russians and Muslims
2.1 From the 16th to the 20th Centuries
2.2 Attitudes Toward Islam During This PeriodVarious Attempts to Create a "New Historical Community"
3.1 "The Soviet People"
3.2 "Multiethnicity" and "Multiconfessionalism"
3.3 "We Are Russovians"
3.4 "The Multinational People of the Russian Federation" and Its "Cement"
3.5 "Russians Regardless of Ethnic Origin"
3.6 "The Infinite Genetic Code" and EugenicsThe Failure of All Attempts and the Tragic Evidence Thereof
Reasons for the Muslim Ummah's Resistance to Sociocultural Exchange
5.1 Arab-Centric Nature of Islam
5.2 "The Territory of War"
5.3 The Russian Federation and Islamic FundamentalismConclusion
6.1 Research Findings
6.2 Final RemarksBibliography
In his recent address to the Muslims of Russia on Kurban Bayram/Eid al-Adha celebration, Vladimir Putin, yet again, repeated the mantra about their “contribution to the unity of our people and the development of interethnic and interreligious dialogue.” Putin was referring to that mythical “multinational people” of the Russian Federation, which, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is “the only source of power.” It takes neither a historian nor a constitutional law expert to immediately identify the source of inspiration for the authors of the concept of creating this very “multinational people.” It is, of course, the very “Soviet people” from the text of the USSR Constitution: the “Soviet people formed as a new historical community of individuals in a society of mature socialist social relations, on the basis of the convergence of all classes and social strata, the legal and factual equality of all nations and nationalities, and their fraternal cooperation.”
This article will not delve deeply into the reasons for the failure of the Bolshevik project to create a “new historical community of people—the Soviet people” or the overall “construction of a classless communist society,” nor into the false concept of “multiethnicity” of the Russian Federation (which attempts to portray the Russian Federation as the only country on Earth inhabited by people of different nationalities and religions simultaneously), nor the refusal by the current Russian political regime to grant political subjectivity to Russians, who make up over 80% of the population. Only selected aspects of the place and role of Islam in statehood will be considered in the context of relations with the Russian population, the transformation of the artificial construct of “multiethnicity,” and evaluations of current circumstances and events related to the declared theme.
It does not seem important to examine in detail the retrospective spread of Islam into lands bordering the historical territories inhabited by Russians, nor to deeply study the interaction between Russians and Muslims, including periods of confrontation, in past centuries. There are several obvious reasons for this:(1) Events from a thousand years ago are, for the most part, myths and legends, or have become enshrouded in myths and legends that have replaced actual events, and thus cannot be subjected to objective historical analysis;(2) The circumstances and events of past centuries only minimally influence the current trends in Russian-Muslim relations;(3) In any case, until the early 1990s, the number of Muslims and their proportion relative to the Russian and other populations of the Tsardom of Moscow, the Russian Empire, and the Russian Federation was significantly smaller than it is today.
The first Muslim subjects of Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible of Moscow appeared only in the mid-16th century, following the conquest of the Kasimov, Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates. Around the same time, Bashkir Muslims voluntarily became subjects of the Tsar, and by the end of the 16th century, the Siberian Khanate had also been annexed. In the late 18th century, Kazakh Muslims and Crimea, predominantly populated by Tatar Muslims, became part of the Russian Empire. By the mid-19th century, as a result of the Caucasian Wars, the predominantly Muslim North Caucasus was annexed by the Russian Empire, and by the end of the 19th century, Muslim Central Asia had been conquered. Thus, despite various speculations found in Muslim sources about the alleged adoption of Islam by Slavic tribes during the reign of Igor (the son or ward of Rurik), supposedly from the Volga Bulgars or from Central Asian Khwarezm, in reality, Russians began to coexist with Islam within the same state only at the end of the 16th century, and territories with significant Muslim populations were incorporated into the Russian Empire only in the 19th century.
It should be emphasised that, according to the 1897 General Census of the Russian Empire, Muslims formed the majority (90.29%) only in Central Asia. In the Caucasus, Muslims made up only 30.54%, except for the Dagestan and Baku regions, where their share exceeded 80%. In the most densely populated European Russia (excluding Poland and Finland), Muslims made up merely 3.82% of the population, while Catholics accounted for 4.65%, Jews for 4.07%, and Protestants for 3.3%.
It is also worth briefly noting that, unlike the history of Islam's spread in other regions of the world, Muslims became subjects of the Tsardom of Moscow and the Russian Empire exclusively as a result of either military conquest of their territories or their voluntary submission to superior military force. Partly for this reason, the autocracy’s interest in Muslim matters was not intellectual but practical. Muslims were viewed as a sociocultural phenomenon unsuitable for assimilation and integration according to the model deemed optimal by the state. For example, the work by D. Cantemir, The Book of the Systymina or the State of the Mohammedan Religion (1722), written at the request of Emperor Peter I, is filled with critical rhetoric and an openly negative religious evaluation of Islam. In 1788, by decree of Empress Catherine II, the first official organisation of Muslims—the Mohammedan Spiritual Administration—was established in Ufa to ensure additional state control over the Muslim clergy, the composition of which was already entirely determined by the state. Overall, attitudes toward Islamic matters remained largely unchanged until the fall of the Russian Empire, despite a certain interest in Muslim cultural-historical material by some 19th-century Russian philosophers (e.g., Konstantin Leontiev), and in the early 20th century by the theorists of Eurasianism.
The so-called “Soviet state,” which ended in a completely predictable collapse, was driven by a monstrous Bolshevik scheme to eradicate all forms of national identity and to artificially create a “new historical community of people – the Soviet people” to build a “socialist society.” This applied equally to Russians and other ethnic groups, including Muslims. The Soviet regime proclaimed “equality of all nations and nationalities, their fraternal cooperation,” and declared that it had “forever ended national enmity” and had “strengthened the friendship of the nations and nationalities of the USSR.” However, what united Russians and Muslims was only their lack of rights under the Bolshevik “Red Terror,” forced collectivisation, persecution of the clergy, and Stalin’s Great Repressions.
It is worth noting that during the collapse of the USSR, it was precisely in regions predominantly populated by Muslims that large-scale and extremely bloody interethnic conflicts and pogroms occurred (“the Fergana events” in the Uzbek SSR in 1989, the Baku pogroms in the Azerbaijani SSR in January 1990, and riots in Dushanbe in the Tajik SSR in February 1990)—events that were largely avoided in other parts of the disintegrating USSR.
It was on the ruins of the USSR, in the newly formed state of the Russian Federation, that the flawed concept emerged—of creating a new historical community characterised by “multiethnicity” and “multiconfessionalism” (though in reality, the homegrown ideologues primarily meant not different Christian denominations, but different religions, and above all—Islam). It is not at all surprising that such an idea originated in the offices of the former communist nomenklatura, which was shaping the new political regime based on its doctrinaire worldview. Essentially, the chimera of “multiethnicity” and “multiconfessionalism” was a kind of reincarnation of the cadaver of the “Soviet people,” with the only difference being that now, Russians were not asked to completely abandon their national identity for the sake of building communism, but rather to agree to the loss of their political agency, as well as their national interests and freedoms, in favour of national and religious minorities—allegedly for the sake of preserving territorial integrity.
After the collapse of the USSR, six new independent national states with Muslim majorities were formed—Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, in the newly emerged Russian Federation, only 7 out of 89 federal subjects had predominantly Muslim populations: Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan, which together made up, according to various estimates, between 5.5% and 8% of the total population of the Russian Federation.
Nevertheless, as early as the beginning of 1993, the rhetoric of the state began to formulate the idea of “creating a society” that was “independent of beliefs and national affiliation,” and phrases like “we have one homeland” and “regardless of nationality – we are Rossiyane /Russovians” entered official usage. In other words, at this stage, Russians—who made up more than 80% of the Russian Federation’s population—along with other nationalities practicing Islam, who accounted for less than 8%, and all other national minorities, were assigned a kind of supranational identity based solely on the fact of being born within the territorial boundaries of the Russian Federation. It is obvious that on this existential issue, the political regime formed by the former communist elite did not consider it necessary to consult the views of Russians, Muslims, Yakuts, Tuvans, Erzyas, or any of the people living in the Russian Federation.
Along with the change in Russian Federation's political regime in 1999, there was an explosive growth in both legal and illegal immigration, consisting predominantly of Muslims from Central Asian countries—a trend that continues to this day. Over the past 25 years of effectively unchanging presidential leadership, many millions of citizens from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have entered and naturalised in the Russian Federation. This immigration flow, alongside the high birth rate of the Muslim population in Russian Federation, as well as the demographic crisis and significant emigration of Russians, has substantially altered the country’s population makeup. Primarily, it has led to a significant increase in the proportion of Muslims, which, as early as 2009, was estimated at no less than 15% of the population. Since around that same time, the Russian Federation has had the largest number of residents practising Islam of any country in Europe.
Practically from that point onward, the political regime’s nomenklatura began increasingly to replace the term "Rossiyanin" (a civic term, meaning all citizens of Russian Federation, with Russovian being a more accurate version) with the euphemism “the multiethnic people of the Russian Federation.” In 2012, Vladimir Putin publicly refused to replace the absurd phrase “multiethnic people” in the preamble to the Constitution with “the Russian people and the peoples who joined them.” Simultaneously, he characterised Russians as “the cement of the multiethnic people” of the Russian Federation.
Thus, at this stage, a new concept of identity was formulated to replace “Rossiyane//Russovians” and the idea of a “unified homeland”: a supposedly unified “multiethnic people” had formed in Russian Federation, consisting of many national groups, not only those born in Russian Federation. And Russians were said to be “cementing” these people. Figuratively speaking, the authorities built a house in which various nationalities were settling, by their desire, and the walls of this house were made of Russians, who had no other choice.
In that same year, 2012, Vladimir Putin published an article titled “Russia: The National Question”, in which he attempted to articulate a modified concept of the Russian Federation’s “multiethnicity.” He categorically and without evidence declared the very idea of a “nation-state,” especially a “Russian nation-state,” to be flawed. He then dove headfirst into his central thesis: “We are a multiethnic society, but we are one people.”
The article proceeded to test a new formula: “We can recall that many Soviet citizens, when abroad, identified themselves as Russians, regardless of their ethnic background.” The article goes on to equate the USSR with “historical Russia of the 18th century,” and uses late-Soviet phrase“ a hundred ethnicities,” and also “Russian Azerbaijanis,” “Russian Tatars,” “a civilization-state with no national minorities,” “the necessity of close Eurasian integration,” “integration of various ethnic groups and faiths,” “the inevitability of mass migration,” and the claim that “illegal immigration can never be entirely prevented anywhere.”
Unsurprisingly, the article also contains threats aimed at those who even consider “parasitising on the topic of the national oppression of Russians.” Putin bluntly declares that “one thing must not be allowed”—the possibility of creating political parties “based on nationalist forces and circles.” Then comes a rhetorical crescendo: “This kind of civilizational identity is based on preserving the Russian cultural dominance, the bearers of which are not only ethnic Russians but all who share this identity, regardless of their nationality.”
Pushing through the heavy-handed abstraction and needless tautology, the author’s intention becomes clear: to begin using the term “Russians” in place of and alongside the previously favoured “multiethnic people of the Russian Federation,” which itself had earlier replaced “Rossiyane” as a reinterpretation of the “Soviet people.” In other words, the political regime had decided to strip ethnic Russians of their own national identity and hand it over for use by any other ethnic groups as it saw fit.
Later, in Putin’s rhetoric, a strange idea emerged—and even became somewhat obsessive—about an “infinite genetic code,” which supplemented the concept of Russians as the “cement” of the Russian Federation’s “multiethnic people.” Initially, he publicly praised, under various circumstances, the “growth of the Islamic population” in Russia and expressed “joy” that “in some of our republics, predominantly with Islamic populations, the birth rate is very good.” Later, Putin began to flirt with what can only be described as the promotion of eugenics. Here is his direct quote from 2021: “...unlike other nations, old or rapidly ageing, we are still on the rise—we are a fairly young nation. We have an infinite genetic code. It is based on a mixing of bloods, to put it simply and plainly.” And in 2023, he publicly described mixed marriages as “a great thing,” asserting that “in our country, everything happens naturally, over the centuries,” and that “on a day-to-day, genetic level, this creates a massive safety cushion and is the foundation of our interethnic and interfaith unity”. How this rhetoric will affect the fate of the Russian population—and its already tragic demographic situation—remains unclear, but it is more likely to further damage the national identity of Russians.
If one sets out to study how the 75-year-long Bolshevik experiment of creating a “new historical community of people — the Soviet people” based on “equality of all nations and ethnic groups,” as well as the past 25 years of testing the concept of a “multiethnic people of the Russian Federation” based on the “integration of various ethnicities and faiths,” have influenced the processes of sociocultural exchange between the Russian and Muslim populations, one can confidently conclude that these efforts have been unsuccessful.
As in the late 19th century, the Russian population and the Muslim population remain separate and weakly integrated, despite the explosive growth of Muslim migration, unprecedented compared to previous centuries, into major metropolitan areas such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg.
Regardless of all the efforts of the political regime and certain of its representatives, who are occasionally allowed to echo state propaganda by declaring things like “There are more than 20 million Muslims in our country. These are Russian people. Allah is great. Come to us, Muslims…” or by rhapsodizing about the “indescribably Russian” nature of the Chechen Padishah, or even exclaiming with theatrical fervour, “I am your brother, Hamas!” — for the Russian population, the Muslim ummah remains an alien ethnocultural phenomenon.
This is exactly how Islam is characterised by the majority of respondents (26%) in response to the question posed by VCIOM sociologists: “Which religion seems most foreign to you?” This likely explains the very limited interest of the Russian majority in the culture of the Muslim ummah. It is enough to point out that the number of ethnic Russians who have converted to Islam, by various estimates, barely exceeds an almost invisible several thousand people.
Traditional attempts to explain the circumstances described above solely through accusations of xenophobia or Islamophobia among Russians have long lost their novelty. Counterarguments to this thesis — especially those related to particular features of Islamic doctrine that hinder sociocultural exchange — are generally not explored and rarely appear in public discourse.
Unfortunately, the most visible evidence of Muslims’ unwillingness or inability to integrate is not found in the results of sociological surveys, but in the numerous terrorist acts carried out with alarming regularity by members of the Muslim ummah within Russia. These include, for example: the 2009 murder of Moscow by a Kyrgyz Islamist priest Father Daniil Sysoev, who was dedicated to Christian missionary work among Muslims; the 2024 murder of Father Nikolai Kotelnikov in front of his family by Dagestani Islamists; and the 2025 brutal stabbing of Ilyas Safiulin, an altar server at a Moscow church and a Tatar convert to Christianity, by an Islamist from Uzbekistan.
So, what, then, so deeply hinders the cultural integration of devout Muslims? For any researcher — even one who is neither a religious studies scholar nor an Islamic specialist, but who has access to open Muslim sources in Russian that describe certain features of Islamic dogma — it is not at all difficult to conclude the most obvious reasons behind this phenomenon.
First and foremost is the Arabocentrism of Islam. On one hand, it proclaims the superiority of the Arabic language and culture, encouraging all non-Arabs to adopt it. On the other hand, it entirely denies the possibility of correctly understanding Islam by non-Arabs, and fundamentally challenges the legitimacy of a Muslim identity outside the Arabocentric cultural context, as well as the possibility of peaceful coexistence with non-Arab and non-Muslim populations.
It is critically important to understand that for Muslims, the foundational expression of their faith is the Holy Qur’an (al-Qur’an, meaning “recitation” or “admonition” in Arabic), which was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and is considered the direct word of God in Arabic. Muslims believe that Allah explicitly stated: “Indeed, we have made it an Arabic Qur’an so that you might understand” (43:3), and also: “…We have sent it down as a ruling in Arabic” (13:37).
According to Islamic theologians, no translation of the Qur’an can truly convey its precise meaning and beauty. The only acceptable form of translation is one made directly from the Arabic text by a believing Muslim, under the supervision of Islamic scholars. A translation of the Qur’an into Russian that meets all these criteria appears to have been published for the first time only in 1995 (by Magomed-Nuri Osmanov.
Moreover, Islamic theology directly asserts that the understanding of Islam is exclusively possible for those who study the Arabic language:
“It is a fard (religious obligation) for people to learn Arabic. Indeed, this is considered a collective obligation (fard al-kifaya), in order to understand the commands and prohibitions of Allah, His promises and warnings, and to comprehend what the Messenger of Allah has explained.”
In addition, Muslim theologians have spoken very negatively about those who speak non-Arabic languages without necessity: “Whoever speaks in our mosque in a non-Arabic language should be expelled from it,” or: “As for the habit of speaking a non-Arabic language — which is the symbol of Islam and the language of the Qur’an — this is undoubtedly blameworthy (makruh), as it amounts to imitation of non-Arabs (at-tashabbuh bil-a’jam), which has already been condemned.”
Other hadiths state directly that the Arabic language itself is a part of the Religion, and learning it is a mandatory religious duty: “Study the Sunnah and study the Arabic language. Study the Qur’an in Arabic, for it is in Arabic,” and: “Learn Arabic, for it is part of your Religion.”
All of this theological dogma logically leads to the Islamic principle of at-tashabbuh bil-kuffar (“imitation of non-Muslims” in Arabic), which directly condemns the rejection of the Arabic language as a loss of Muslim identity — a motivation for committing both minor and major sins (kabair).
It is evident that with such dogmatic foundations in place, any integration of Muslims with the Russian population, predominantly East Slavic and characterised by modern secular or Christian self-identification, is fundamentally impossible.
An even more alarming factor is the second one: Islamic jurists (fuqaha) divide all lands of the world into several evaluative categories of territorial space, referred to as “dar” (Arabic for "domain" or "territory"). Regulation by Sharia (“way of conduct” in Arabic — effectively a set of obligatory norms governing nearly all spheres of a Muslim's daily life) over a wide range of human relations (muamalat) directly depends on which specific " domain " is being discussed.
Despite a certain degree of pluralism among Islamic scholars and some evolution in definitions over the centuries, the following division of the world is generally accepted in contemporary Islamic thought: domain
“Territory of Islam” (Dar al-Islam) — Domain where Islam prevails; that is, territory where Muslims are the majority or where Islamic rule, laws, and leaders recognising Sharia are in place;
“Territory of Truce” or “Territory of Treaty” (Dar al-Sulh / Dar al-Hudna) — Neutral territory, considered an intermediate category between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb;
“Territory of War” or “Territory of Disbelief” (Dar al-Harb / Dar al-Kufr) — Domain where Islam is absent or weak.
For devout Muslims residing in a “Territory of War” or “Territory of Disbelief”, wala’ — the feeling of loyalty, solidarity, or support toward another religion, or more broadly toward non-Muslim societies and states — is strictly prohibited. Furthermore, in such territories, the property of non-believers (harbis) is generally permitted to be appropriated by Muslims. Citizenship in a non-Muslim (kafir) state is not considered a legitimate peace treaty and does not obligate the Muslim to honour it. Moreover, in any case where the Prophet of Islam is insulted within such a territory, the offender loses any form of protection. The following quote serves as a confirmation of the above: “Even though it is permissible to seize the property of individuals in Dar al-Harb, we advise Muslims not to attack ordinary civilians, especially in places where public opinion plays a role in the affairs of Muslims. Therefore, we advise targeting the following: government property; banks; global corporations; and property belonging to infidels known for their hostility toward Muslims.” Unfortunately, according to some Islamic authors who cite consultations with students of Islamic knowledge, openly available sources assert that: “…for the majority of devout Muslims, and in most of its regions — the Russian Federation is considered Dar al-Harb…”
Despite the obvious foundational reasons that prevent devout Muslims not only from integrating into the modern secular society of the Russian Federation but also from abandoning the idea of confrontation with it, the political regime of the Russian Federation, represented by Vladimir Putin, continues to regularly declare the supposed absence of any contradictions with Islamic fundamentalism and the alleged impossibility of attacks from Muslims. As recently as early 2024, Putin publicly asserted the following: “Russia (the Russian Federation) cannot be a target of terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists. Our country demonstrates a unique example of interfaith harmony and unity, religious unity, and interethnic cohesion.” Unfortunately, the many hundreds of victims of the terrorist attack by Islamic fundamentalists from Tajikistan at the Moscow Expo Centre on March 22, 2024, and the inevitable victims of future terrorist acts, will not be able to share the optimism of such statements.
The answer to the natural question — whether such a claim is the result of misinterpretation of Islamic dogma, a consequence of ignorance, or a conscious disregard of an objective threat — will most likely only become clear to researchers after a change in the political regime.
In conclusion, it must be stated that the historically persistent weak integration between ethnic Russians and the Muslim population, spanning centuries, has been characterised by extremely limited cultural exchange. It is important, once again, to emphasise the fiasco of social experiments—both the Bolshevik and Putin-era attempts—to create a synthetic society through the “blending” of the Russian majority and the Muslim minority. No matter what name was invented by the architects of this unnatural construct— “Soviet people,” “Rossiyane/Russovians” (citizens of Russia), “multiethnic people of the Russian Federation,” or “Russians regardless of nationality”—the result remained unchanged.
It is critically important to highlight the features of Muslim dogma, particularly the Arab-centric nature of Islam and its general disapproval of affiliation with predominantly non-Muslim societies and states—factors that directly hinder most forms of cultural exchange between the Muslim ummah and the predominantly Russian population. It is also imperative to firmly declare the necessity of rejecting any attempts, including those already deemed unacceptable, such as eugenic methods, to interfere with the “genetic code” of the Russian people.
As a final remark, one cannot ignore the fact that the current policy of the Russian Federation—aimed at deepening “tight Eurasian integration” and based on the premise of the “inevitability of mass migration”—stands in direct contradiction to the stated and actively implemented policies of the U.S. administration to reduce migration, as well as to the growing success of nationalist parties in Europe and the United Kingdom, which advocate for stricter migration controls.
Ilya Ilyin
May 6, 2025
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