Western policy on Russia often overlooks a key domestic force: the rise of a younger generation of Russian nationalists and right‑wing populists. Unlike the older Soviet‑shaped elites, they are grassroots, secular, market‑oriented, and increasingly sceptical of both Putin’s imperial course and Moscow’s alignment with Beijing.

I watched "Five Questions for Stephen Kotkin: Advice for the New Administration" (and the Rest of Us https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8wTBy_tgKo) with great interest. At the 36-minute mark of the interview, Professor Stephen Kotkin expressed the idea that Russian nationalists may represent the best hope for the United States and its allies. He reasons that Russian patriots are genuinely concerned about the future of their country and recognise that the current course pursued by Putin’s elite is destroying both the nation’s prospects and its people. The professor is right to argue that engagement with Russian patriots is essential—not only to gain a better understanding of the processes unfolding within Russia, but also to consider what kind of deal might be offered to factions within the Russian elite that could be prepared to overthrow the current ruling group.

In my view, Stephen Kotkin is right to say that in the short term, the only hope for both the West and Russia lies in Russian nationalists/Russian patriots. However, I believe that a change of elites in the Kremlin is unlikely as long as the pro-Chinese faction of the establishment holds power firmly.

It is important to understand that people of the Soviet generations, even if they consider themselves Russian patriots, unfortunately, perceive patriotism in a supranational and imperial way. Psychologically, they are passive loyalists rather than national revolutionaries, ready to act in the interests of the people rather than the individual who leads the system. This was clearly demonstrated by the failure of Prigozhin’s mutiny.

What Western experts, unfortunately, fail to see is that a new generation of Russian nationalists and right-wing populists has emerged. These groups and movements rose up democratically from the grassroots, despite state repression or forced compliance with Putin’s policies. This young generation is Americanized (having grown up on American mass culture), secular, and liberal in terms of personal ethics. They support a market economy and individual freedom, including libertarian positions. They understand national interests through the lens of the people’s interests, not those of the ruling class or any messianic ideology.

These individuals are friendly—or potentially friendly—toward the United States if a hand is extended to them. Most of them recognise that the imperial path is not suitable for Russia and believe that a healthy nation-state must be built. There is also a shared consensus among them that ethnic Russians in their own country are under threat and treated as second-class citizens—a resource base for the supranational ruling elite, influential ethnic clans, and cannon fodder for a fratricidal war against Ukrainians.

Looking back at history, it is worth noting that the Russian Marches, held since 2005, along with other public actions by Russian nationalists, quickly became the largest opposition street political events in modern Russia. They retained this status until the well-known civic protests of 2011–2013, despite all the efforts of the Presidential Administration and Russian security services to create spoiler organizations, imprison or intimidate nationalist leaders who took part in civic protests against the Kremlin’s policies on a broad range of issues — from migration and interethnic policy to matters concerning freedom of speech and the protection of political prisoners’ rights.

It should be noted that President Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, and other representatives of the Russian establishment repeatedly, and in effect explicitly, described Russian ethnic nationalism as the main threat to the state. They opposed it with a neo-Soviet model of the Russian political nation, which implies loyalty to the ruling neo-feudal elites through a statist, hollowed-out form of patriotism. The Kremlin, not without reason, feared a Maidan-type scenario, in which an ethno-nationalist agenda could ally with the libertarian and classical liberal demands of small and medium-sized Russian businesses and the post-industrial stratum of educated urbanites — largely employed in intellectual labour and the service sector — that emerged during the period of rising prosperity in the Russian Federation.

Such an alliance was beginning to take shape in the form of a synthesis of liberal, democratic, and ethno-nationalist ideas, symbolised by Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s attendance at the Russian March in 2011 — an act that for years provoked a heated reaction from the Kremlin and its propagandists.

It should be emphasised separately that the neo-Soviet revanchist war launched by the Kremlin against Ukraine in 2014 demonstrated that the majority of the Russian March audience — ranging from various far-right groups to more moderate national democrats — sharply opposed the “fratricidal war” or openly supported Ukraine. Those nationalists who sided with the Kremlin — whether out of fear of repression, ideological alignment, career considerations, or tactical calculations — were forced to acknowledge that most Russian March participants did not support the occupation of Crimea or the backing of the so-called L/DNR, and some even threatened physical violence against those who adopted loyalist positions toward Vladimir Putin and his regime.

The Kremlin took harsh revenge on Russian ethno-nationalists: the Russian March was banned, participant organisations were outlawed, leaders ended up in prison or exile, and the number of those affected by this wave of political repression runs into the thousands. Many of them—numbering in the thousands—have fought with weapons in hand on Ukraine’s side against the Kremlin since 2014.

Yet this is an inconvenient narrative for the Kremlin, for representatives of the liberal opposition, and for many Western experts and journalists, who for decades have lumped the Russian March audience among Vladimir Putin’s supporters — and, more absurdly still, have counted Putin himself, who has consistently advocated preserving the Soviet legacy, Soviet imperial multinationalism, and the brutal suppression of Russian nationalism, among the ranks of Russian nationalists.

It is unfortunate that Russian nationalism in the West is associated with the caricature-like imperial nonsense of Dugin, Limonov, and Malofeev — something I am certain is deliberately sustained by the Kremlin so that, against the backdrop of any alternatives, Putin and his regime appear the most moderate and centrist. The fear of Russian nationalism in the West is a convenient narrative, one that is also used by the Russian authorities.

The younger generation of nationalists—those forced to be loyalists and to support the war against Ukraine just to stay in the public-political space—openly admit that the war is going badly and that Russians will ultimately be the main losers. These individuals are disillusioned, yet they are quite popular in society and possess combat experience. The core combat unit of the now-dismantled Wagner PMC—Prigozhin’s private army—consisted of people with openly neo-Nazi views. Yet these individuals, like many war correspondents and pro-war (“Z”) bloggers, became opponents of the Putin regime and were subjected to political repression.

I believe the United States should place its bets on such people and movements rather than on the liberal Russian opposition. Only a national and democratic revolution in Russia can lead to a desirable change of elites in Moscow, remove the pro-Beijing faction, and return Russia to the fold of European civilisation.

I also believe that on the American side, especially within expert circles, it is important to work on this issue with pro-Western Russian realists. This is crucial to ensuring that decision-makers act appropriately. Unfortunately, I currently see an extremely low quality of expertise and analysis on Russia from leading Western think tanks and policymakers. As a result, many decisions are misguided, and large amounts of funding for supporting democracy in Russia have been wasted.

From my perspective, Russian society is deeply concerned about Islamization, the replacement of the European population with migrants, and the Kremlin’s pro-Chinese course that runs counter to national interests. These concerns fuel the growing popularity of ethno-nationalists. The Kremlin, however, cannot address this societal demand, as it is forced to adhere to an imperial, multicultural paradigm and build a “Russian nation” according to Soviet blueprints.

That is why I am convinced that if we work effectively with Russian nationalists both inside and outside the country, it is possible to shift Russian public opinion in a pro-American and pro-Western direction. The younger generation of Russians, when given a choice between Washington, Beijing, and Pyongyang, will choose the first.

In fact, I am optimistic about the possibility of regime change in Russia through a nationalist “Maidan”-style uprising, as this has become the general paradigm in Eastern Europe—virtually all such revolutions against post-Soviet regimes were primarily nationalist in nature. I attribute this to the fact that classical Western-style nation-states are still in the process of formation across the post-Soviet space, especially in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia.

Only a grassroots, network-based national-democratic movement—capable of mobilising thousands of people across Russia, including, if necessary, armed supporters—can create the conditions for a real split within the Russian elite. Such groups already exist and enjoy significant popularity, as illustrated by the substantial following of the Russian Volunteer Corps. The decisive factor will be when the elites begin to fear representatives of the national resistance more than Putin’s secret police.

Without a broad nationalist and democratic movement capable of becoming a force in domestic politics, any hope of a split within Russia’s elites is nothing more than waiting for milk without a cow.

Given the global context—reminiscent of both the Cold War and the early 20th-century great-power rivalries—it is, regrettably, no longer realistic to imagine a purely peaceful transformation. “Other means” will inevitably come into play. Recent examples in Afghanistan and Syria demonstrate how effective change requires a synthesis of a mass movement, external and internal financial support, and, critically, military force grounded in the first two elements. The outdated, factionalised, and globally oriented liberal opposition is incapable of undertaking such a struggle—lacking both the will to risk and the ideological faith such a campaign demands.

Nevertheless, I am convinced that Russia still harbours immense potential for a national-populist uprising against the neo-Soviet Putinist regime. The Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policies are generating growing resentment among precisely those citizens with strong patriotic convictions. In this sense, Russian society retains the potential to return to the path of European civilisation and to finally break free of the destructive Soviet-imperial legacy. Yet the current stage of the struggle will almost certainly take a hybrid form. Russian volunteers fighting alongside Ukraine provide a clear example of how such a model can function in practice.

Looking through the lens of historical analogy, Russians, and Americans—engaged today in a Cold War against Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions—require nothing less than a Russian Chiang Kai-shek and a Russian Kuomintang. Without such an effort, the power of the Russian state and its vast natural resources will serve only to strengthen China, tilting the global balance of power decisively against Washington and its allies.

Link: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/missed-ally-why-washington-should-look-russian-anton-gromov-5etuf/

Anton Gromov