Demography of Russians: 25 Years of ‘Putinwave’
When looking at the constitution of Russia, it seems that it constitutes a multiethnic federation where the largest ethnicity does not have a majority, at best approaching the Soviet result of being half of the total population. And just like the Soviet Union ended with breakaway states, some people project the same future for the Russian Federation. The reason why the largest Soviet republic, which later became the Russian Federation, was called the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic is that ethnic Russians have constituted more than a standard definition of supermajority, having more than 80% of the total population identifying themselves with the Russian ethnicity. The fact that number decreased in next censuses can only indicate that the Russian Federation is far from being a nationalist state, as Russians as an ethnicity currently face paramount issues regarding diaspora/emigration, population decline due to a combination of heightened mortality and reducing fertility (which is a result of a current war initiated by Putin), and an unrestricted migration that is comparable in absolute terms to the United States. To give an overview, the article will explain why ethnic Russians remain the only potential entity for a change in Russia and what issues concern them.
Ethnic Composition of Russia: Focus on Russians
At first glance, when looking at the latest official census of Russia, all data points to a decrease in the number of people identifying as ethnic Russians. Compared to the 2010 census, where 77.69% of the population declared their ethnicity to be Russian, 2020 data shows a decrease of 6 percent and 71.76% Russians. This raises two major questions: why such a drop would happen in a state bent on seemingly promoting it, and what happened to those people? Did they disappear? The first answer is clear, since the Russian Federation does not present itself as a nation state with ethnic autonomies but as an entity with different subjects and legal systems. Giving a majority similar power could undo the system like the USSR. Answering the second question requires going deeper into the statistics and uncovering the unusual method it was done.
The trick lies in Article 26 of the Russian constitution, allowing people to refuse to declare their ethnic origin. Compared to 2010, when 3.94% of the population did not disclose their origin, the 2020 census saw the non-disclosive population rise to 11.64%. Two situations arise. Option one means they feel assimilated and integrated into contemporary Russian society without mentioning their ethnic origin. Then that number can be combined with the number of Russians to add up to 83.4% of the population. The second option indicates that people are feeling suppressed and no longer feel comfortable revealing personal information beyond the bare minimum, fearing oppression. That case results in 80.85% of Russians out of the total number of people who continue to declare their ethnicity. Both options lead to the conclusion that ethnic Russians remain a clear and dominant majority of the population on a level comparable to other states in Europe. Compared to England and Wales, the latest census puts only 74.4% of the White British population, a lower number than includes other nations of Britain besides the Welsh and English in the measurement.
Demographic challenges of Russians
The issue that truly concerns Russians is the demography, with the existing war prolonging the adversity. Average fertility in Russia has dropped to numbers not seen since the 1990s, the period associated with hardship as Russia transitioned away from the Soviet legacy. The data is scarier in absolute numbers and brings Russia to the late 18th century. When looking at the fertility by regions (Figure 1), traditionally, ethnic Russian areas in Russia are among the anti-leaders in fertility, with Chechnya being the leader in fertility, followed by the Tuva Republic.
While the drop in fertility is a global trend and Russians are not the only ones in that regard, a sharp rise in mortality makes the Russian case stand out. Just as the mortality was being addressed and the population started to naturally grow, Putin chose open confrontation and brought death back to hundreds of thousands, culminating in the COVID-19 pandemic mistreatment that exceeded a million. The decision to start a full-scale war with Ukraine continued to maintain mortality above half a million per year.
In addition to these challenges, emigration and diaspora keep millions of Russians abroad. To this day, Russians remain the third-largestdiaspora worldwide, with over 10 million people outside of the country. The deteriorating domestic situation did not encourage a return and continued pushing more Russians outside, even when the economic conditions improved. The process continued for decades, and the latest emigration wave post-2022 does not cover 10% of the existing emigrants. With such demographic challenges, a government that was truly nationalistic and cared about its population would not further complicate demographic challenges. Instead, population decline is managed through immigration.
One long ‘Boriswave’
The same publication that shows Russia having a large diaspora also shows Russia as an immigration destination. Recently, a term was coined to describe a sharp increase in migration after the new regulation, called ‘Boriswave’. As a result of Boris Johnson’s reform, migration reached an all-time high and exceeded 1 million in new residents of the United Kingdom. Had there been a free and independent press in Russia, there definitely would have been a similar term to describe the migrant situation in Russia, as a long ‘Boriswave’, as the immigration has been continuing during Putin’s rule (including his Prime Minister position). The recent legal amendment made in 2023 is offering all citizens of post-Soviet states a shortened path to citizenship, also could mark a start for the term ‘Putinwave’. After all, the prior migration system was established by Yeltsin and provided visa-free travel for the members of the Commonwealth of the Independent States, which at the time included all former Soviet states except for the Baltic states. With the Central Asian states having higher fertility and fewer economic opportunities, many would utilise the choice and immigrate to Russia.
However, the official migration data does not offer the full picture. It ignores undocumented migrant workers, who are not included in the official statistics. But that does not stop them from working and living in Russia. Their number can only be estimated. While the official number within the last year is 6.1 million within the entire country and around a million in Moscow, the statements from the last decade would not make sense. In 2014, Vyacheslav Nikonov, the Chairman of the Education Committee of the Russian Duma, said that Moscow is the city with the largest Muslim population in Europe (Istanbul is not fully located in Europe, thus it cannot be included). But let us review the official population data for 2010 Moscow. 91.6% Ethnic Russians, according to those statistics, makes it impossible to reach such a number of Muslims without undocumented migration. The closest approximation of the real number of migrants can be calculated by relying not on the data from the Ministry of the Interior but from the security services. In 2019, FSB calculated that 32.6 million people crossed the border into Russia. If the number of all migrants in Russia is close to this number, then the only country that has a similar number of migrants is the US. Had Russia been democratic, a migration issue would be dominating the public debate, not the military confrontation with neighbours.
Troubles and a chance to change
The demographic landscape of Russia establishes the groundwork for a nation-state, only for the government to fight against it. Even though official narratives suggest otherwise, ethnic Russians—still a supermajority—now face significant challenges: a shrinking population share, rising mortality rates, declining fertility, and considerable emigration. The Kremlin is dealing with these challenges primarily through immigration, especially from post-Soviet countries, which is transforming the nation’s ethnic and cultural landscape. A lack of transparent data and public debate obscures the full extent of these demographic shifts. Thus, the phenomenon of migration and demographic engineering stands out as a notable feature of the last 25 years that can be described as a stronger ‘Boriswave’-Putinwave’. Despite that effort, ethnic Russians remain the sole group with the demographic capacities and potential to bring changes in Russia, if Russian civil society can be safely established beyond the reach of the Kremlin.
Figure 1. Fertility map of Russia in 2024
