Groups that rely on the Kremlin’s mercy

Before addressing genuine Russian nationalist groups, it is important to show their difference from loyalist/conditioned groups that work under the Kremlin framework. At this moment, only the representatives of conditioned nationalism, to the state of Russian nationalism, exist as groups who refuse to address nationalistic points as threatening to the state. Thus, many are forced to be silent lest they be faced with an arrest, or focus on remote issues that barely interest society. Official nationalist parties in Russia exist as components of the state system, functioning similarly to other political factions by supporting the government at crucial moments. Figures like Konstantin Malofeev and various non-suppressed so-called nationalist organisations align themselves not with democratic ideals or popular rule, but with Putin’s leadership, advocating only for symbolic changes while hoping to avoid repression. This form of "official nationalism" has historical roots in the ideology of Sergey Uvarov, who promoted "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality" as a state doctrine in contrast to the democratic ideals of the French Revolution. Official Russian nationalism is state-driven, centred more on loyalty to imperial symbols than on Russian cultural identity.

The first and largest group are ‘official’ nationalists who have to rely on the Kremlin’s goodwill for existence and thus generally keep silent unless the Kremlin asks them to speak. They remember what happened with Strelkov/Girkin, who is serving time in prison. They can be activists and public figures of Kholmogorov or Russkaya Obschina/Russian Community, or military organisations such as Espanola or Rusich. Those military organisations are currently far from the numbers of the Wagner PMC, either conflicting with Kadyrov’s men or patrolling the border with Finland. They have learned to keep quiet on the issues that might provoke the Kremlin. When Putin visited Kadyrov and his clan in August 2024, everyone kept silent and did not comment on how Putin openly supported Kadyrov despite recent military scandals and showed his trust by allowing armed members of Kadyrov’s clan in his vicinity. The only comments produced are bloodthirsty calls for prisoner sacrifices that further marginalise these organisations. With barely any views and resources, most ‘official’ nationalists are in a negligible position, fading into obscurity. Especially when these groups have no stable finances.

Groups that try to impress the Kremlin, but show too much initiative

Money is not an issue for organisations and people connected with Konstantin Malofeev, an ‘orthodox oligarch’. The key person connected to Malofeev is Alexander Dugin, an esoteric philosopher without clear educational credentials, who some believe is the key influence in forming the Kremlin’s views and ideology. Regretfully for them, Dugin is more interesting to Western audiences who want to see a second Rasputin in him. Had he been truly influential, Dugin would be in an official position in Russia’s State Council as an official advisor. The fact that Dugin is mainly preoccupied with the Politics Faculty at Russian State University for the Humanities is a major drop from Moscow State University, especially since his faculty cannot be found alongside existing departments, institutes and faculties. 

After seemingly preventing the renaming of a new education and research centre, Dugin is busy teaching a ‘westernology’ course to tackle Eurocentrism and a decolonial breakaway from the Western style of thought. It seems that the peak of Dugin's recognition in the Kremlin was the moment they offered him condolences after his daughter was killed. Nowadays, he is attending conferences alongside Malofeev, where he would call Aymeric Chauprade a major geopolitician, even though his main “contributions” were leaving the National Rally and having the daughter of Putin’s press secretary as an intern.

Regarding Konstantin Malofeev, he is completely loyal to the Kremlin line, trying for many years to get into politics but to no avail. His choice of religious conservatism is too enthusiastic for the Kremlin, too independent to wait for the signal. His recent campaign is a struggle against the education system that teaches evolution. His campaign became too public for the Russian Orthodox Church, so the patriarch had to intervene and defend evolution classes personally. What political capital and favours with the church Malofeev may have accumulated before 2023 have been mainly undone by his latest marriage. 

Not only did he divorce his previous wife without an acceptable reason according to the Church, but he also had an affair with Maria Lvova-Belova, who at the time was married to a priest and had nine children. And yes, the same Maria who was issued an arrest warrant for the deportation of Ukrainian children. With Malofeev unable to attract the organisation he has spent years donating to, it is doubtful he can succeed elsewhere. That leaves Malofeev’s attempt to create a nationalist-patriot movement as the only option. 

Malofeev’s creation is Dvuglavyi Orel/Double-headed Eagle, an organisation that aims to gather patriotic youth to help establish an empire and protect the Russian nation. Other than continuing Malofeev’s pursuit of religious conservatism, that movement is showing its loyalty by assisting Russia’s Investigative Committee in assisting with raids on illegal migrants, with not even a hint of discontent that other organisations show towards other nationalistic issues. 

For them, Russia is on the right path, and the head of the Investigative Committee of Russia, Alexander Bastrykin, who has been suppressing and arresting other independent nationalist and civil organisations, is deserving of praise and many more years of service. In a somewhat ironic twist, Bastrykin is currently the most notable government official who can make nationalistic statements that indicate that not everything is good in Russia. Unfortunately for him and other official nationalists, he cannot stand against the rest and is forced to apologise for his nationalistic declarations.

Outside solution

The conditioned version of Russian nationalism lacks an independent civil society foundation, and with the state controlling religious and ethnic definitions, what remains is pure autocratic loyalty. Former head of the political department of the United Russia, Alexei Chadayev, has explained what the Kremlin wants, ensuring society remains passive. Every excessive expression, even loyalist, is a risk factor, as the initiative goes away from the Kremlin. Ensuring real politics would mean the end of the regime.

The combination of various potential issues and utter silence about them from loyalist nationalist groups can change the Kremlin's monopoly over the Russian nationalism narrative. Any new group/organisation has fertile soil of unspoken narratives since the potential competitors are suppressed or choose to ignore issues that undermine the success of the Kremlin. Additionally, if the new group starts campaigning from abroad, they will not have to be afraid of fines or arrests. The only way to prevent new nationalist narratives from emerging would be to block Russia’s connection to the global Internet completely, China-style, too expressive. That is something that the Kremlin is not ready to do; it has resumed publications on YouTube.